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1
Introduction
In various situations such as on a market, a soccer match, or in klaver-
jassen, many decisions have to be taken, and those decisions will induce
an output: the profit of a firm, or the identity of the winning team. And
sometimes, decisions have to be taken regularly (each day, each month,
each year), and the outcomes of those decisions might not be clear yet
when the players take these decisions.
In this thesis, we will use Game Theory to analyse such situations in
which firms or individuals interact repeatedly with each other. In Game
Theory such a setting is called a repeated game, and the decision makers
are called players. The possible decisions that players can make in a
game are called strategies.
We are going to use two solution concepts to analyse repeated games.
The first concept is based on the notion of regret, and the second is Nash
equilibrium.
Regret is a notion based on an ex-post analysis. The regret induced by a
strategy is the difference between the expected payoff of this strategy
and the maximal payoff that the player could have gotten in retrospect.
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Then, each player is interested in choosing a strategy that minimizes his
regret. This notion of (dynamic) regret was introduced by Zinkevich
in 2013. Before that, the notion of regret was based on the best static
strategy, where a strategy is static if it uses the same action at every
time period.
Another central solution concept in Game Theory is the Nash equilib-
rium, named after its inventor, the Nobel prize winner John Nash. A
Nash equilibrium is a situation in which every player uses a strategy
in such a way that, knowing the strategies of the other players, has no
incentive to deviate from his strategy for another one.
In Chapter 2, we introduce a game over infinitely many periods, in
which players have to take decisions at each period. Players have
imperfect information with respect to their payoff and the strategies
of their opponents: they have an indication about what they should
play today based on the decisions taken in the previous days in order
to maximize their payoff, but do not know exactly how much they
will earn. Moreover, they do not observe the actions chosen by their
opponents at any time.
In such an environment, the computation of equilibrium is hard, as
players are uncertain about the past choices of the other players, and
therefore they do not know their own payoff. For this reason we use
regret as our solution concept in this chapter.
We study an algorithm that gives the players an advice on which choice
to make based on what the players learnt yesterday. We show that if
the players follow the advice of the algorithm, they are guaranteed
a low regret against a specifically chosen dynamic strategy that does
not change too much over time. Moreover, if the sequence of stage
games does not vary too much over time, and if the players follow the
advice of the algorithm, then the sequence of strategies converges to an
equilibrium in the long run.
In Chapter 3, we present an algorithm in a general framework. We
present known convergence results of this algorithm, and very recent
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results of strong convergence. Our main focus in this chapter is to
present its application to solve traffic network problems. We assume
that commuters are on a network, and that each of them wants to travel
from one node (his origin) to another (his destination). A commuter
wants to reach his destination as close as possible to a specific time : he
can arrive earlier or later than the designated time, but the bigger the
gap is, the worse it is for the commuter.
The algorithm, taking into account all these parameters, derives the best
flow of commuters over the network, recommends to each commuter
the path he should take, and decides at which time he should start
form his origin. A relevant solution concept in this setting is the Nash
equilibrium: the output of the algorithm is publicly observed, and given
that other commuters are obediently follow the recommendation of the
algorithm, it is a best response to do so as well.
In a Nash equilibrium, commuters with identical characteristics (same
origin, same destination and same desired arrival time) may have to
take different paths in order not to overload the network. We finally
compare the performance of this algorithm to other algorithms that
were previously designed for finding the equilibrium of a congested
network. In several cases, the algorithm we propose outperforms other
algorithms.
While in Chapters 2 and 3 the main focus is to find an algorithm which
implements an equilibrium, in Chapter 4 the main focus is on existence
of Nash equilibria, and the stability of Nash equilibria under perturba-
tions of the parameters of the game. Existence of Nash equilibrium is a
fundamental problem in Game Theory, and establishing the existence
can be a challenging problem.
In Chapter 4 we study a two-player game, played over infinitely many
periods. An object is hidden in one of finitely many locations, called
states, and two players compete to find the object. The players sequen-
tially choose one of the different states. If the object is there, then the
active player wins and the game stops. Otherwise, the object moves
randomly to another state and the next player is asked to choose.
3
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One can imagine, as on the cover of the thesis, two pirates looking for
a treasure based on information written on a treasure map, but at the
same time, the annoying Molly the mole moves the treasure below the
ground. A more concrete (and more serious) application would be to
consider two laboratories competing to find a cure for a viral disease.
At each period, one of them receives a research grant that allows to
invest in one of many different technologies in order to find a cure.
However, the virus mutates over time, and a good technology today
might become useless in a few months.
There are two relevant notions of equilibrium that we use as a solution
concept in this chapter: the Nash equilibrium, and its refinement, called
subgame perfect equilibrium. The latter solution concept has the advan-
tage that it takes into account mistakes of the players. More precisely,
a subgame perfect equilibrium is a strategy profile such that what-
ever happened in the past, it induces an equilibrium in the remaining
game.
We identify conditions under which subgame perfect equilibria do exist.
We also show that Nash equilibrium does not always exist, but that a
slightly weaker solution concept, called ε-equilibrium, always exists.
We show that those equilibria are stable to perturbations, such as time
discounting, or if the game ends in a long but finite horizon. Finally we
study structural properties of the game.
Detailed discussion of the Chapters
Chapter 2
In Chapter 2 we examine the long-term behavior of regret-minimizing
agents in time-varying games with continuous action spaces. In its most
basic form, (external) regret minimization guarantees that an agent’s
cumulative payoff is no worse in the long run than that of the agent’s
best fixed action in hindsight. Going beyond this worst-case guarantee,
we consider a dynamic regret variant that compares the agent’s accrued
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rewards to those of any sequence of play. By properly adapting a restart
procedure pioneered by Besbes et al. [7], we show that players are
able to achieve no dynamic regret against any test sequence whose
total variation grows sublinearly with the horizon of play. In particular,
specializing to a wide-class of no-regret strategies based on mirror
descent, we derive explicit rates of dynamic regret minimization, both
in expectation and with high probability. We then leverage these results
to show that players are able to stay close to Nash equilibrium in time-
varying monotone games – and even converge to equilibrium if the
sequence of stage games admits a limit.
Chapter 3
In Chapter 3 we use a class of strongly convergent primal-dual schemes
for solving variational inequalities defined by a Lipschitz continu-
ous and pseudo-monotone map in infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces,
which have been studied by Dennis Meier in [22]. This novel numerical
scheme is based on Tseng’s forward-backward-forward scheme, which
is known to display weak convergence, unless very strong global mono-
tonicity assumptions are made on the involved operators. We test the
performance of the algorithm in the computationally challenging task
to find dynamic user equilibria in traffic networks and verify that our
scheme is at least competitive to state-of-the-art solvers, and in some
cases even improves upon them.
Chapter 4
In Chapter 4 we introduce a discrete-time search game, in which two
players compete to find an object first. The object moves according to a
time-varying Markov chain on finitely many states. The players know
the Markov chain and the initial probability distribution of the object,
but do not observe the current state of the object. The players are active
in turns. The active player chooses a state, and this choice is observed by
the other player. If the object is in the chosen state, this player wins and
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the game ends. Otherwise, the object moves according to the Markov
chain and the game continues to the next period. We show that these
games admit a value, and for any error-term ε > 0, each player has a
pure (subgame-perfect) ε-optimal strategy. Interestingly, a 0-optimal
strategy does not always exist. The ε-optimal strategies are robust in the
sense that they are 2ε-optimal on all finite but sufficiently long horizons,
and also 2ε-optimal in the discounted version of the game provided that
the discount factor is close to 1. We derive results on the analytic and
structural properties of the value and the ε-optimal strategies. Moreover,
we examine the performance of the finite truncation strategies, which
are easy to calculate and to implement. We devote special attention to
the important time-homogeneous case.
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Learning in time-varying games
In this Chapter 1, we examine the long-term behavior of regret-minimi-
zing agents in time-varying games with continuous action spaces.
2.1 Introduction
A key requirement for decision-making in unknown, non-stationary
environments is the minimization of regret: no rational agent would
want to realize in hindsight that the decision policy they employed was
strictly inferior to a crude policy prescribing the same action at each
stage. Of course, depending on the context, this minimal worst-case
guarantee admits several refinements. For starters, agents could tighten
their comparison benchmarks and, instead of comparing their accrued
rewards to those of the best fixed action, they could compare them
to general test sequences that evolve over time. Moreover, if agents
1This chapter is based on [23]. I would like to thank the referees for their helpful
comments and discussion. This research has been partially supported by the COST
Action CA16228 ”European Network for Game Theory” (GAMENET)
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interact with one another and their rewards are determined by a fixed
underlying mechanism – that of a non-cooperative game – there are much
finer criteria that apply, chief among them that of convergence to a Nash
equilibrium.
Since real-world scenarios are rarely stationary and typically involve
several interacting agents, both issues are of high practical relevance
and should be treated in tandem. With this in mind, the central question
that we seek to address in this chapter is as follows: What is the long-run
behavior of strategic agents that follow an adaptive no-regret policy when the
underlying game evolves over time in an unknown, unpredictable manner?
Our contributions and related work
Our analysis revolves around two main axes, as outlined below:
Dynamic regret minimization
First, we examine the case where an agent seeks to minimize his regret
against a fixed (but otherwise arbitrary) stream of payoff functions. As
a comparison benchmark, we posit that the agent compares the rewards
accrued by their chosen sequence of play to any other test sequence (as
opposed to a fixed action). In particular, as a special case, this definition
of regret also includes the agent’s best dynamic policy in hindsight, i.e.,
the sequence of actions that maximizes the payoff function encountered
at each stage of the process.
This measure of regret is considerably more ambitious than the standard
definition of external regret (which only considers constant sequences
as performance benchmarks). One of its antecedents is the notion of
shifting regret which considers piecewise constant benchmark sequences
and keeps track of the number of “shifts” relative to the horizon of play
[13, 44]. Much closer in spirit is the dynamic regret definition of Besbes
et al. [7] which takes as a benchmark the sequence of instantaneous pay-
off maximizers (individual best responses) of each stage. The analysis of
8
[7] shows that, in full generality, it is not possible to achieve no dynamic
regret if the total variation of the sequence of payoff functions grows
linearly with the horizon of play. However, if this growth is sublinear,
attaining no dynamic regret becomes possible by means of a restarting
procedure that amortizes the dynamic regret incurred by a policy with
no static regret over a sequence of time windows of increasing length.
Our first result is an extension of this heuristic to the context of arbitrary
test sequences: As we show in Section 2.4 , by using a carefully crafted
restart procedure in the spirit of [7], an agent is able to achieve no regret
relative to any slowly-varying test sequence – i.e., any test sequence
whose total variation grows sublinearly with the horizon of play. In
particular, under mild regularity assumptions, a sequence of concave
payoff functions with sublinear total variation admits a slowly-varying
sequence of maximizers (so we recover the original result of Besbes et
al. [7] as a special case). Results of this flavor are not entirely new in
the learning literature. Indeed, looking at the variation of comparator
sequences is also prominent in the classical online convex optimization
framework, which is a zero sum game of a single decision maker against
nature (see e.g. [44] and references therein). However, to the best of our
knowledge, the general strategic setting has never been studied. An
important benefit of our formulation is that it shifts weight from the total
variation of the payoff functions encountered to that of their maximizers:
trivially, if each payoff function is shifted by a random constant at each
stage, the total variation of the stream of functions encountered might
be linear even though the set of maximizers remains the same. Perhaps
less trivially, our result shows that the change of a function away from
its maximum set does not really matter for dynamic regret minimization:
the key limitation is the variation of the maximizers.
To quantify the above, we focus on decision-making policies based on
online mirror descent (OMD), a broad class of algorithms that includes as
special cases the online gradient descent (OGD) method of Zinkevich
[113], the well-known multiplicative weights (MW) algorithm [3], and
9
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many others.2 First introduced by Nemirovski and Yudin in the context
of convex programming [87], mirror descent is one of the most widely
used policies for achieving no static regret in online optimization and is
well-known to be black-box optimal in that respect [100]. Our analysis
in Section 2.6 extends these results to the context of dynamic regret
minimization: by leveraging the restart procedure of Besbes et al. [7],
we show that the class of policies under consideration attains a regret
minimization rate of O(T 2/3V 1/3) relative to test sequences with total
variation V over T stages.
This regret minimization rate essentially coincides with the bound
obtained by Besbes et al. [7] for slowly-varying streams of payoff
functions. Going beyond this basic bound, and under mild assumptions
for the information available to the agent at each stage, we also show
that this rate holds not only on average, but also with overwhelming
probability. We make all this precise in Section 2.6, where we establish
a large deviations bound for the algorithm’s dynamic regret.
Game-theoretic learning
The second element of our analysis concerns the underlying assump-
tion that the sequence of payoff functions encountered by an agent is
oblivious. Specifically, this means that, when calculating the payoffs
that the agent would have obtained by employing a different sequence
of actions, the stream of payoff functions encountered by the agent
remains the same. This assumption is well-grounded in the literature
of (adversarial) online optimization as a minimal worst-case guaran-
tee; however, in a game-theoretic setting, it is more difficult to justify.
For instance, if two regret-minimizing players are involved in a game,
the payoff functions encountered by one player will be influenced by
the action choices of the other. Thus, if one player were to employ a
2Above, the word “descent” should really be “ascent”, because players are typically
maximizers in game theory. To avoid this clash in terminology, we use the more
neutral term “proximal method”.
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different sequence of actions, the other player would most likely re-
spond differently, altering in this way the sequence of payoff functions
encountered by the first player (and vice versa). As such, even dynamic
regret minimization against a fixed stream of payoff functions does not
provide strong optimality guarantees in a game-theoretic setting.
To address this issue, we consider a general multi-agent framework
where, at every stage t = 1, 2, . . . , each player’s payoff function is deter-
mined by the action choices of all other players via a non-cooperative
game Gt. The stage game Gt may vary with time, but the rules governing
its evolution are not a priori known to the players (so the rationalistic
viewpoint of the literature on repeated/dynamic games does not ap-
ply). In this context, the main question we seek to address is as follows:
If all players follow a dynamic regret minimization policy, do their actions
eventually get close to a Nash equilibrium at each stage?
Without further assumptions, the answer to this question is “no”, even
when players face the same stage game throughout. Indeed, (external)
regret minimization in finite games guarantees that the players’ empiri-
cal frequencies of play converge to the game’s Hannan set (also known
as the set of coarse correlated equilibria) [50], but this set may contain
strategies that assign positive weight only to dominated strategies [109]
(and these cannot be supported at a Nash equilibrium). In fact, in
two-player zero-sum games, no-regret learning may cycle indefinitely
without converging, always remaining a bounded distance away from
the game’s Nash set [75, 78]. On the other hand, if the game satisfies
a monotonicity condition known as diagonal strict concavity (DSC) [95],
Mertikopoulos and Zhou recently showed that no-regret policies based
on mirror descent converge to Nash equilibrium with probability 1,
even with imperfect gradient information on the players’ side [79].
Building on our dynamic regret analysis, our first result is that if a) the
stage games are monotone; and b) they admit a slowly-varying sequence
of Nash equilibria, no-regret learning with a judiciously chosen restart
schedule as in [7] allows players to remain close to the game’s evolving
equilibrium (at least on average). More to the point, as a refinement
11
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of this result, we show that if the sequence of stage games converges
to a strictly monotone game, then the induced sequence of play con-
verges to a Nash equilibrium thereof. Importantly, this last result holds
globally (i.e., independently of the algorithm’s initialization) and with
probability 1, irrespective of the magnitude of the noise entering the
players’ gradient signals.
In our view, these results constitute a first step towards understanding
the behavior of utility-maximizing agents in unknown, online environ-
ments, where the top-down, “rationalistic” viewpoint of the theory of
repeated and dynamic games does not apply. Specifically, even though
the standard rationality postulates do not hold in our setting (knowl-
edge of the game being played, common knowledge of rationality, etc.),
our results show that no-regret learning can still lead to equilibrium
in dynamic environments. We find this property of regret minimiza-
tion particularly appealing, as it provides an important link between
online learning and the emergence of rational behavior in strategic
environments that evolve over time.
Notation
Given a finite-dimensional vector space V with norm ‖·‖, we will write
V∗ for its (algebraic) dual, 〈y, x〉 for the duality pairing between y ∈ V∗
and x ∈ V , and ‖y‖∗ = sup{〈y, x〉 : ‖x‖ ≤ 1} for the dual norm of y ∈ V∗.
If X is a closed convex subset of V , we write ri(X ) for its relative interior
and diam(X ) = sup{‖x′ − x‖ : x, x′ ∈ X} for its diameter. Finally, if xt,
t = 1, 2, . . . , is a sequence of elements of X , we will write xT ≡ (xt)t∈T
for the subfamily of elements indexed by a subset T of N.
2.2 Preliminaries
2.2.1 Concave games
The focal point of our analysis will be games with a finite number
of players and continuous action sets. Specifically, every player i ∈
12
N ≡ {1, . . . , N} is assumed to select an action xi from a compact
convex subset Xi of a finite-dimensional normed space Vi. Subse-
quently, based on each player’s individual objective and the action
profile x = (xi;x−i) ≡ (x1, . . . , xN ) of all players’ actions, every player
receives a reward, and the process repeats.
In more detail, writing X ≡ ∏i∈N Xi for the game’s action space and
V ≡ ∏i∈N Vi for its corresponding ambient space,3 we assume that
each player’s reward is determined by an associated payoff (or utility)
function ui:X → R.4 Since players are not assumed to “know the game”
(or even that they are involved in one) these payoff functions might
be a priori unknown, especially with respect to the dependence on the
actions of other players. Following [95], our only structural assumption
for ui will be that
ui(xi;x−i) is concave in xi for all x−i ∈ X−i, (2.1)
where, in obvious notation, X−i =
∏
j 6=iXj denotes the action space
of all players other than the i-th one. For regularity purposes, it will
also be convenient (albeit not necessary) to assume that each ui is C1-
smooth in x; to streamline our presentation, these will be our standing
assumptions in what follows.
With all this in hand, a concave game will be a tuple G ≡ G(N ,X , u) with
players, action spaces and payoffs defined as above. Below, we briefly
discuss some recurring examples of such games:
Example 2.2.1 (Mixed extension of finite games). In finite games, each
player i ∈ N chooses an action (or pure strategy) αi from a finite set Ai.
The players’ payoffs are then determined by the pure strategy profile




2. Also, to streamline our presentation, we will use the same
notation for the norm of each factor space Vi and rely on the context to resolve any
ambiguities.
4For book-keeping reasons, it will be convenient to assume that ui is actually defined
on an open neighborhood of X in V . However, none of our calculations depend on
this device, so we do not make this assumption explicit.
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α = (αi)i∈N of all players’ actions via a collection of payoff functions
ui:A ≡
∏
j Aj → R.
In the mixed extension of a finite game, players are allowed to randomize
their decisions by playing mixed strategies, i.e., probability distributions
xi ∈ ∆(Ai) with the interpretation that xiαi is the probability of choos-
ing action αi ∈ Ai. In this case (and in a slight abuse of notation), the








ui(α1, . . . , αN ) x1,α1 · · ·xN,αN . (2.2)
Since each player’s mixed strategy space Xi = ∆(Ai) is convex and ui
is individually linear in xi, it follows that mixed extensions of finite
games are concave in the sense of (2.1).
Example 2.2.2 (Saddle-point problems). Consider a saddle-point prob-






where each feasible region Xi, i = 1, 2, is a compact convex subset of
Vi ≡ Rdi and f :X1×X2 → R is assumed to be convex in x1 and concave
in x2. Letting u1 = −f and u2 = f , the saddle-point problem (SP) can
be seen as a zero-sum game with player set N = {1, 2} and payoff
functions ui, i = 1, 2. Since f is convex-concave, the resulting game
G ≡ G(N ,X , u) is itself concave in the sense of (2.1).
Example 2.2.3 (Resource allocation auctions). Consider a service
provider with a splittable resource (bandwidth, computing cores, ad
display time, etc.). Fractions of this resource can be leased to a set
of N bidders (players) who can place monetary bids xi ≥ 0 for the
utilization of said resource up to each player’s total budget bi. Once all
bids are in, resources are allocated proportionally to each player’s bid,
i.e., the i-th player gets ρi = (qxi)/(c+
∑
j∈N xj) units of the auctioned
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resource, where q denotes the total amount of the resource and c ≥ 0
represents an “entry barrier” for bidding on it. A simple model for the
utility of player i is then given by
ui(xi;x−i) = [giρi − xis], (2.3)
with gi denoting the marginal gain of player i from acquiring a unit
slice of resources. Writing Xi = [0, bi] for the action space of player i, it
is easy to see that the resulting game G ≡ G(N ,X , u) is concave in the
sense of (2.1).
Many other important scenarios can be formulated as concave games;
for an incomplete list, see [59, 79, 24, 92, 101, 74] and references
therein.
2.2.2 Nash equilibrium
The most prevalent solution concept in game theory is that of a Nash
equilibrium (NE), defined here as any action profile x̂ ∈ X that is resilient
to unilateral deviations, i.e.,
ui(x̂i; x̂−i) ≥ ui(xi; x̂−i) for all xi ∈ Xi and all i ∈ N . (NE)
By the classical existence theorem of Debreu [17], concave games with
compact action spaces always admit a Nash equilibrium. Moreover,
thanks to the individual concavity of the game’s payoff functions, Nash
equilibria can also be characterized via the first-order optimality condi-
tion
〈vi(x̂), xi − x̂i〉 ≤ 0 for all xi ∈ Xi, i ∈ N , (2.4)
where vi(x) denotes the individual payoff gradient of the i-th player,
i.e.,
vi(x) = ∇xiui(xi;x−i), (2.5)
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and ∇xi denotes differentiation with respect to the variable xi.5
Geometrically, this characterization of Nash equilibria simply means
that vi(x̂) belongs to the polar cone
PCXi(x̂i) = {yi ∈ V∗i : 〈yi, xi − x̂i〉 ≤ 0 for all xi ∈ Xi}. (2.6)
of Xi at x̂i, i.e., vi(x̂) forms an obtuse angle with any displacement
vector of the form zi = xi − x̂i, xi ∈ Xi. By concavity, this means that
ui(x̂i + tzi; x̂−i) is nonincreasing in t, so (NE) holds for all xi ∈ Xi. We
will use this geometric intuition freely in what follows.
2.2.3 Variational inequalities and monotonicity
The first-order characterization (2.4) of Nash equilibria can be written
more concisely (but otherwise equivalently) as a variational inequality
of the form
〈v(x̂), x− x̂〉 ≤ 0 for all x ∈ X (VI)
where
v(x) = (v1(x), . . . , vN (x)) (2.7)
denotes the players’ individual gradient profile at x ∈ X . As a result,
finding a Nash equilibrium of a concave game amounts to solving
the (Stampacchia) variational inequality problem (3.5). This important
observation has been the starting point of an extensive literature at the
interface of game theory and optimization; for an overview, we refer
the reader to [89, 25, 99, 79] and references therein.
Most of this literature has focused on problems where the vector field
v(x) of individual payoff gradients satisfies the monotonicity condi-
tion
〈v(x′)− v(x), x′ − x〉 ≤ 0 for all x, x′ ∈ X . (MC)
5We adopt here the established convention of treating vi(x) as an element of the dual
space V∗i of Vi. We do so in order to emphasize the fact that vi(x) acts naturally
on vectors zi ∈ Vi via the (linear) directional derivative mapping zi 7→ u′i(x; zi) =
d/dt|t=0 ui(xi + tzi;x−i).
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Owing to the link between (MC) and the theory of monotone operators
in optimization, games that satisfy (MC) are commonly referred to as
monotone games [99, 79].6 In particular, mirroring the corresponding
terminology from operator theory, we will say that a game is:
a) Strictly monotone if (MC) holds as a strict inequality when x′ 6= x.
b) Strongly monotone if there exists a positive constant β > 0 such that
〈v(x′)− v(x), x′ − x〉 ≤ −β‖x′ − x‖2 for all x, x′ ∈ X . (2.8)
Obviously, we have the inclusions “strongly monotone” (
“strictly monotone” ( “monotone”, mirroring the corresponding chain
of inclusions “strongly convex” ( “strictly convex” ( “convex” for
convex functions.
The set of Nash equilibria of a monotone game – which coincides with
the solution set of (3.5) – is itself convex and compact; in particular, if
the game is strictly or strongly monotone, its Nash set is a singleton
[25, 4, 79]. Moreover, on account of (MC), Nash equilibria of monotone
games can also be characterized in this case as solutions of the Minty
variational inequality
〈v(x), x− x̂〉 ≤ 0 for all x ∈ X . (MVI)
This property of Nash equilibria of monotone games will play a crucial
role in our analysis and we will make free use of it in the rest of our
paper; for a more detailed discussion, we refer the reader to [79].
In terms of applications, monotone games constitute a very rich and
diverse class. Cournot oligopoly models [80], atomic splittable conges-
6Rosen [95] uses the name diagonal strict concavity (DSC) for a weighted variant of
(MC) which holds as a strict inequality when x′ 6= x. Hofbauer and Sandholm [54]
use the term “stable” to refer to a class of population games that satisfy a condition
similar to (MC), while Sandholm [97] and Sorin and Wan [101] respectively call such
games “contractive” and “dissipative”. We use the term “monotone” throughout to
underline the connection of (MC) with operator theory and variational inequalities.
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tion games in networks with parallel links [92, 101], signal covariance
optimization problems in wireless communications [99, 74], and many
other problems where online decision-making is the norm. In particular,
the class of monotone games contains all games that admit a (strictly)
concave potential, i.e., a function f :X → R such that
vi(x) = ∇xif(x) for all x ∈ X , i ∈ N . (2.9)
In view of all this, monotone games will comprise an important part of
our analysis, especially in the context of convergence to Nash equilib-
rium.
2.3 Problem setup
We now turn to a detailed description of our model for time-varying
games. In its most general form, this boils down to the following
sequence of events:
Time-varying games: sequence of events
Require: set of players i ∈ N, action spaces Xi ⊆ Rdi
1: for t = 1, 2, . . . do
2: set G ← Gt(N ,X , ut) #stage game
3: for all i ∈ N do






6: get signal Y ti #receive feedback
7: end for
8: end for
The core ingredients of the above framework are a) the sequence of
games Gt, t = 1, 2, . . . , encountered by the players at each stage of the




Our standing assumptions for the sequence of stage games
Gt ≡ Gt(N ,X , ut) will be that a) they are concave (in the sense of 2.2.1);
and b) only the players’ payoff functions evolve over time. In particular,
the set of players N and their action spaces Xi, i ∈ N , are assumed to
remain the same for all t. Nonetheless, if the payoff function of some
player i ∈ N is identically equal to zero at stage t and their actions
have no impact on other players, this player is effectively removed
from the stage in question. Similar devices can also account for action
spaces that vary with time (at least, as long as they are contained in
some compact set), so the model at hand is sufficiently general for our
purposes.
Two important special cases of this framework are when:
1. There is a single player and the sequence of stage games is fixed in
advance (but is otherwise arbitrary). This unilateral framework is
the gold standard in online learning (cf. the various definitions of
regret in the next section) and has the property of being oblivious,
i.e., a different sequence of play would yield the same sequence
of payoff functions.
2. The sequence of stage games is constant, i.e., Gt = G for some fixed
game G. This case is the norm in game-theoretic learning and, in
addition to comprising several players, its main difference with
the online learning framework is that it is not oblivious. In general,
given the dependence of the payoff function of player i on the
actions of all other players, a different sequence of actions Xt ≡
(Xti ;X
t
−i) would yield a different sequence of payoff functions
ui(·, Xt−i).
In view of the above, a time-varying game can be seen as an amalgama-
tion of these two classical frameworks: in particular, the dependence of
a player’s payoff function on the stage index t is both explicit (via the
sequence of stage games Gt) and implicit (via the sequence of actions
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chosen by all other players). This “dual” dependence on t will play a
key role in what follows, especially in the equilibrium analysis of 2.7.
In terms of regularity, we will be assuming throughout that the players’
individual payoff gradients are uniformly bounded, i.e., there exists
some finite Gi ≥ 0 such that
‖vti(x)‖∗ ≤ Gi for all t = 1, 2, . . . , and all x ∈ X , (2.10)
where, in obvious notation, we have set
vti(x) = ∇xiuti(xi;x−i). (2.11)
Other than that, we make no prior assumptions about the process that
defines each stage game. For instance, this evolution could be random
(i.e., Gt could be determined by some randomly drawn parameter θt),
it could depend on the players’ actions (e.g., as in the literature on
dynamic/repeated games), some underlying (hidden) Markov chain,
or any other mechanism. We also do not assume that such information
is available to the players: from their individual point of view, each
player is involved in a repeated decision process where the choice of an
action returns a reward, and they have no knowledge of the mechanism
generating this reward. The reason for this “agnostic” approach is that,
in many cases of practical interest, the standard rationality postulates
(full rationality, common knowledge of rationality, etc.) are not realistic:
for instance, a commuter choosing a route to work has no way of
knowing how many commuters will be making the same choice, let
alone how these choices might influence their thinking for the next
day.
Signals and feedback
The second core ingredient of our model is the feedback available
to each player after choosing an action. In tune with the “bounded
rationality” framework outlined above, we do not assume that players
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can observe the actions of other players, their payoffs, or any other
such information. Instead, we take a “partial monitoring” approach –
see e.g., [96, 15, 66, 68] and references therein – and we only posit that
every player i ∈ N receives a (random) signal Y ti from space containing
payoff-relevant information for each stage t. In particular, we will be
assuming that the random signal received by player i at stage t is of the
general form
Y ti = v
t
i(X
t) + U ti , (2.12)
where Xt = (Xti ;X
t
−i) ∈ X is the profile of actions at stage t (possibly
random), and U ti is a stochastic perturbation of the realized payoff
gradient, modeling observational noise in the feedback signal. As such,
under this model, the signals of player i ∈ N are drawn from the dual
space Yi ≡ V∗i of the ambient space Vi of Xi.
Remark. In optimization-theoretic terms, the signal model (2.12) means
that each player has access to a (stochastic) first-order oracle, i.e., a black-
box feedback mechanism providing (possibly noisy) gradient informa-
tion at each stage. From a game-theoretic standpoint, the motivation for
this signal model is rooted in the case where players can only observe
their realized, in-game payoffs (the so-called bandit setting). In this
extremely low-information environment, it is still possible to construct
an oracle of the form (2.12) by means of a simultaneous perturbation
stochastic approximation (SPSA) procedure as in [102, 26]; we defer the
details of this analysis to a future paper.
In terms of measurability, it is tacitly assumed that both Xt = (Xti )i∈N
and Y t = (Y ti )i∈N are defined over a common (complete) probability
space (Ω,F ,P), and all expectations or probabilities will be taken with
reference to this space. The private history of player i is then defined as
the filtration Fi = (F ti )∞t=0, where
F ti = σ(X1i , Y 1i , . . . , Xti , Y ti ) (2.13)
is the σ-algebra generated by the player’s chosen actions and signals
received up to stage t (inclusive), while F0i is chosen so as to complete
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the filtration (not necessarily in a trivial way). Aggregating over all play-
ers, the history of play is likewise defined as the filtration F = (F t)∞t=0,
where
F t = σ(X1, Y 1, . . . , Xt, Y t). (2.14)
Given all this, we posit that a player’s action at stage t+1 is determined










for some measurable deterministic function Algi, which will be refer-
rred to as an algorithm (or repeated game strategy).7 This means that, for
all t = 1, 2, . . . , Xt+1i is F ti -predictable – or, collectively, that Xt+1 is
F t-predictable.
In the rest of our paper, and unless explicitly mentioned otherwise, our
blanket assumptions for the signal process Y ti will be as follows:




E[Y ti | F t−1] = vti(Xt) (2.16a)
for all t = 1, 2, . . . and all i ∈ N .
2. Y ti has uniformly bounded second-order moments, i.e.,
E[‖Y ti ‖2∗ | F t−1] ≤M2i (2.16b)
for some Mi <∞ and all t = 1, 2, . . . , i ∈ N .
Alternatively, the above is equivalent to asking that the noise process
U ti is zero-mean with finite mean square, i.e.,
E[U ti | F t−1] = 0 (2.17a)
7To avoid superfluous notation, we are omitting in (2.15) the dependence of X and




E[‖U ti ‖2∗ | F t−1] ≤ σ2 (2.17b)
for some finite σ < ∞ and all t = 1, 2, . . . , i ∈ N . Both of these
assumptions can be relaxed in various ways (e.g., by asking that Y ti
is accurate on average only up to some bias term, or by considering
higher-order moments of U ti ), but it will be more convenient to state
our results with both these assumptions in play.
As a special case, the “noiseless” regime U ti = 0 will be sometimes
referred to as perfect information. However, to avoid clashes with existing
terminology (especially within the literature on dynamic and repeated
games), we stress here that players are never assumed to observe the
actions of other players: even with perfect information, only gradient
observations are available at each stage.
2.4 Regret minimization
2.4.1 Types of regret
As we discussed in the introduction, a minimal worst-case requirement
for online decision-making is that of regret minimization. In the non-
stationary framework of the previous section, the (external) regret of
player i ∈ N over a window of play T ⊆ N is defined as







i.e., as the cumulative difference between the cumulative payoff of the
focal player i ∈ N under the sequence of play Xt ∈ X , t = 1, 2, . . . ,
and that of the player’s best fixed action over the time window T .8
8By “window” we refer here to an interval of successive positive integers, i.e., T is
of the form T = {a, a + 1, . . . , b} for some a, b ∈ N. Unless explicitly mentioned
otherwise, we will only work with intervals of this type.
23
Chapter 2. Learning in time-varying games
Then, specializing to the case where T = {1, . . . , T}, we will say that





Regi(T ) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ N , (2.19)
i.e., if every player’s regret grows at most sublinearly with the horizon
of play:
Regi(T ) = o(T ) for all i ∈ N . (2.20)
By the individual concavity of the players’ payoff functions, the payoff




−i)− uti(Xt) ≤ 〈vti(Xt), xi −Xti 〉, (2.21)
for any reference action xi ∈ Xi and all t ∈ T . Consequently, a player’s
regret can be itself bounded from above as
Regi(T ) ≤ Gapi(T ), (2.22)
where




〈vti(Xt), xi −Xti 〉 (2.23)
represents a linearized, player-specific regret measure that we call the
gap function of player i. Hence, to achieve no regret, it suffices to design
an algorithm guaranteeing that Gapi(T ) = o(T ) for every player i ∈ N .
This linearization device has been the starting point of most no-regret
strategies in the literature (see e.g., [14, 100, 79, 88, 12] and references
therein), and we will use it freely in the rest of our paper.
Of course, an important limitation in the definition (2.18) of a player’s
regret is that it compares the sequence of accrued rewards to that of the
best fixed action in hindsight. Since the players’ payoff functions evolve
over time, a player following a policy satisfying (2.19) may still incur a
substantial loss relative to a non-constant sequence of actions. Thus, to
get a finer performance benchmark, consider instead the dynamic regret
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of player i relative to a test sequence xti ∈ Xi, t = 1, 2, . . . , defined as








Then, as in the static case, we say that a sequence of play Xt leads to no





DynRegi(T ;xTi ) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ N , (2.25)
i.e., if every player’s dynamic regret relative to xt grows at most sublin-
early with the horizon of play T .
As a special case, if xti ∈ argmaxxi∈Xi uti(xi;Xt−i) is a sequence of indi-
vidual best responses of player i to the realized sequence of play Xt−i of
all other players, we get








Comparing this expression to the definition (2.18) of the external regret
of player i, we see that the order of summation and maximization
have been exchanged. In this way, we recover the original definition
of Besbes et al. [7], suitably extended to our multi-agent setting: in the
long run, each player’s accrued rewards are no worse than what the
player would have obtained by best-responding to the sequence of play
of all other players at each stage.
2.4.2 Dynamic regret minimization
Our main goal in the rest of this section will be to provide a univer-
sal bound for the players’ dynamic regret relative to arbitrary test
sequences. To do so, we will again rely on the individual concavity of
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the players’ payoff functions to write
DynRegi(T ;xTi ) ≤
∑
t∈T
〈vti(Xt), xti −Xti 〉, (2.27)
just as in the static case. Then, motivated by the recent analysis of
Besbes at al. [7], we will decompose a player’s dynamic regret into
two components: one driven by the gap function (3.13) over smaller
windows of play, and the other measuring the variation of the test
sequence xti over time, as defined below:
Definition 2.4.1. The variation of a test sequence xti ∈ Xi, t = 1, 2, . . . ,
over the window T ⊂ N is defined as
Vari(T ;xTi ) =
∑
t∈T
‖xt+1i − xti‖, (2.28)
with the convention that xt+1 = xt if t = T .
To proceed with the decomposition outlined above, let Ti,1, . . . , Ti,mi be
a partition of the time window T = {1, . . . , T} into mi batches, each of
size
∆i = bT/mic, (2.29)
with the possible exception of the last one (which might be smaller). We
then have:
Lemma 2.4.2. The dynamic regret of the i-th player relative to a test sequence
xti ∈ Xi, t = 1, 2, . . . , satisfies
DynRegi(T ;xTi ) ≤
mi∑
`=1
Gapi(Ti,`) +Gi∆i Var(T , xTi ). (2.30)
Proof. The proof is an elementary computation building on an idea of
[7]. Indeed, dropping the player index i for notational clarity, individual
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concavity yields



















〈vt(Xt), xt − p`〉, (2.32b)
so that the linearized dynamic regret over each batch can be written as
∑
t∈T`
〈vt(Xt), xt −Xt〉 = I` + J`. (2.33)








〈vt(Xt), x−Xt〉 = Gap(T`).
(2.34)
Subsequently, to bound J`, let p` be the first element of the test sequence
xt over the `-th batch T`. Then,
∑
t∈T`
〈vt(Xt), xt − p`〉 ≤
∑
t∈T`













‖xt+1 − xt‖ = G∆ Var(T`;xT`), (2.35)
where we used Young’s inequality in the first line and the triangle
inequality in the last one. Our claim then follows by summing over
each batch ` = 1, . . . ,m.
Lemma 2.4.2 suggests that minimizing a player’s regret relative to a
rapidly-varying test sequence xti may be difficult (if not downright
impossible). On the other hand, if the test sequence under study is
slowly-varying in the sense that
Var(T ;xT ) = o(|T |), (2.36)
then it might be feasible to attain no (dynamic) regret by properly
tweaking the batch size ∆i in the regret decomposition (2.30).
This observation was the starting point of the analysis of [7] who pro-
posed breaking the horizon of play into batches of a carefully chosen
size, and then running on each batch an algorithm that incurs low static
regret (i.e., sublinear relative to the size of the batch). In our game-
theoretic setting, this boils down to each player choosing a batch size
∆i and breaking the horizon of play into mi = dT/∆ie successive time
windows Ti,1, . . . , Ti,mi , each of size ∆i (except possibly the last one).
Then, at every window Ti,`, each player i ∈ N updates their actions fol-
lowing an (as yet unspecified) algorithm Algi which is restarted every
∆i stages.
Formally, this restart procedure can be encoded in pseudocode form as
follows:
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Algorithm 1 Batch restart (player indices suppressed)
Require: Horizon T, batch size ∆, choice algorithm
Alg as in (2.15)
1: set t← 1 #step counter
2: choose X1 ∈ X #initialization
3: repeat
4: set τ ← b(t− 1)/∆c∆ + 1 #augment every ∆ stages
5: play Xt ∈ X #play chosen action
6: get signal Y t #receive feedback
7: set Xt+1 ← Alg(Xτ , Y τ , . . . , Xt, Y t) #update action
8: t← t+ 1 #next stage
9: until t > T #end play
In view of all this, if the restart frequency is chosen as a function of the
variation of the test sequence under study, we have:
Theorem 2.4.3. Consider a time-varying game Gt ≡ Gt(N ,X , ut), t =
1, 2, . . . , and let Algi be an algorithm of the general form (2.15) such that
E[Gapi(T )] ≤ Ci
√
T (2.37)
for some Ci > 0, for all T ∈ N and all time intervals T ⊆ N of length T .
Suppose further that xti ∈ Xi, t = 1, 2, . . . , is a test sequence enjoying the
variation bound
Vari(T ;xTi ) ≤ V Ti , (2.38)
for some V Ti ≥ 1. Then, if Algi is rebooted every ∆i = d(T/V Ti )2/3e stages
we have
E[DynRegi(T ;xTi )] ≤ (2Ci + 3Gi)T 2/3(V Ti )1/3. (2.39)
In particular, if xti is slowly-varying (i.e., V
T
i /T → 0 as T →∞), we have
lim sup
T→∞
E[DynRegi(T ;xTi )] ≤ 0. (2.40)
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Remark. In the above, expectations are taken with respect to the ran-
domness of the players’ signals (and induced action sequences).
Proof. Taking expectations on both sides of the bound (2.30) yields
E[DynRegi(T ;xTi )] ≤
mi∑
`=1
E[Gapi(Ti,`)] +Gi∆i Var(T , xTi ), (2.41)
where mi = dT/∆ie is the number of restarts up to stage T (inclusive).
Then, with Vari(T ;xTi ) ≤ V Ti and |Ti,`| ≤ ∆i = d(T/V Ti )2/3e, this
bound becomes:











≤ Ci[1 + T 2/3(V Ti )1/3 + (T/V Ti )1/3] +Gi[V Ti + T 2/3(V Ti )1/3]
≤ (3Ci + 2Gi)T 2/3(V Ti )1/3 (2.43)
where, in the last line, we used the fact that V Ti ≥ 1.
2.5 Distributed learning
In this section we present a class of distributed learning algorithms
based on online mirror descent (OMD), a family of algorithms which,
together with the closely related “follow the regularized leader” (FTRL)
protocol, comprise one of the most widely used algorithmic schemes
for no-regret learning in online optimization – for a partial survey, see
[87, 5, 57, 86, 106, 16, 88, 85, 100, 79] and references therein.
Viewed abstractly, the basic idea of mirror descent (or, in our case,
“ascent”) is as follows: if player i ∈ N plays xi ∈ Xi and receives the
gradient signal yi ∈ Yi, the algorithm generates a new action x+i by
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taking an “approximate gradient” step from xi along yi. Formally, this
can be written as
x+i = Pi(xi, γyi) (2.44)
where
1. γ is a step-size parameter controlling the weight attributed to the
signal yi.
2. Pi:Xi × Yi → Xi is a “proximal mapping” (discussed in detail
below) which determines the exact way in which the step along
yi is taken.
Remark. Because the prox-mapping Pi plays a defining role in the play-
ers’ action selection process, and to avoid clashes between the term
“descent” and the fact that players are treated as maximizers in our
setting, we will refer to (2.44) as a prox-method (PM).
Now, given a convex subset C of some ambient vector space V ∼= Rd, the
prototypical example of a prox-mapping is the Euclidean projector
P (x, y) = ΠC(x+ y) ≡ argmin
x′∈C
{‖x+ y − x′‖22}
= argmin
x′∈C
{〈y, x− x′〉+ 12‖x′ − x‖22} (2.45)
i.e., the closest-point projection of x+ y onto C.9 Going beyond the Eu-
clidean case, the key novelty of prox-methods is to replace the distance
term 12‖x′ − x‖22 in (2.45) with a (possibly non-symmetric) “divergence”
defined by means of a distance-generating function (DGF) h: C → R, itself
assumed to be continuous and K-strongly convex, i.e.,
h(tx+ (1− t)x′) ≤ th(x) + (1− t)h(x′)− K
2
t(1− t)‖x′ − x‖2 (2.46)
9Note here that, in writing x + y, we are blurring the lines between primal vectors
x ∈ V and dual vectors y ∈ V∗. This distinction is reinstated in the second line of
(2.45) where y ∈ V∗ is paired properly to x− x′ ∈ V .
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for all x, x′ ∈ C and all t ∈ [0, 1]. For technical reasons (and in a
slight abuse of notation), we further assume that the subdifferential
∂h(x) = {y ∈ V∗ : h(x′) ≥ h(x) + 〈y, x′ − x〉} of h admits a continuous
selection: specifically, letting C◦ ≡ dom ∂h = {x ∈ C : ∂h(x) 6= ∅}
denote the domain of subdifferentiability of h, we posit that there exists
a continuous function ∇h: C◦ → V∗ such that ∇h(x) ∈ ∂h(x) for all
x ∈ C◦.10 The Bregman divergence induced by h is then defined as
Dh(x
′, x) = h(x′)−h(x)−〈∇h(x), x′−x〉 for all x′ ∈ C, x ∈ C◦, (2.47)
and the associated prox-mapping P : C × V∗ → C is given by
P (x, y) = argmin
x′∈C
{〈y, x−x′〉+Dh(x′, x)} for all x ∈ C◦, y ∈ V∗. (2.48)
Remark. Because P is defined only for states x ∈ C◦, the set C◦ will be
sometimes referred to as the prox-domain of h.
Before continuing, it will be instructive to provide some standard exam-
ples of prox-mappings:
Example 2.5.1 (Euclidean projections). We begin by recovering the
archetypal example of Euclidean projections. To do so, let h(x) = 12‖x‖2.
Since h is convex and subdifferentiable throughout C, we have C◦ = C
and ∇h(x) = x is a continuous selection of ∂h(x) for all x ∈ C. Hence,
the associated Bregman divergence is
Dh(x
′, x) = 12‖x′‖22 − 12‖x‖22 − 〈x, x′ − x〉 = 12‖x′ − x‖22, (2.49)
and the induced prox-mapping is given by (2.45) for all x ∈ C, y ∈ V∗.
Example 2.5.2 (Entropic regularization). Let C = {x ∈ Rd+ :
∑d
j=1 xj =
1} denote the unit simplex of V = Rd. A very widely used
distance-generating function for this geometry is the (negative)
10By standard results in convex analysis [93], we have C◦ ⊆ ri C ⊆ C. Note also that
we are making use of the standard convention that h(x) = +∞ if x ∈ V \ {C}.
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Gibbs-Shannon entropy h(x) =
∑d
j=1 xj log xj . By inspection, the domain
of (sub)differentiability of h is C◦ = ri C, and the resulting Bregman











valid for all x ∈ C◦, x′ ∈ C. In turn, this gives rise to the prox-mapping




for all x ∈ C◦, y ∈ V∗. The update rule x+ = P (x, y) is widely known
in the literature as the multiplicative weights (MW) algorithm and plays
a central role for learning in multi-armed bandit problems and finite
games [3, 30, 52, 90].
Example 2.5.3 (Fermi-Dirac regularization). Let C = [0, 1] and let h(x) =
x log(x)+(1−x) log(1−x) be the (negative) Fermi-Dirac entropy. Then,
C◦ = (0, 1) and the induced prox-mapping is given by the expression
P (x, y) =
x exp(−y)
1− x+ x exp(−y) , (2.52)
valid for all x ∈ (0, 1), y ∈ R.
With all this at hand, the general class of game-theoretic learning algo-










1. t = 1, 2, . . . denotes the stage of the process.
2. Xti ∈ Xi is the action played by player i at stage t.
33
Chapter 2. Learning in time-varying games
Algorithm 2 Prox-method for distributed learning (player indices sup-
pressed)
Require: prox-mapping P :X × Y → X, step-size
sequence γt ≥ 0,
sequence of stage games Gt ≡ Gt(N ,X , ut)
1: initialize X1 ∈ argminxi∈Xi hi(xi) #initialization
2: for t = 1, 2, . . . do
3: set G ← Gt(N ,X , ut) #stage game definition
4: play Xt ∈ X #play chosen action
5: get signal Y t ∈ Y #receive feedback
6: set Xt+1 ← P (Xt, γtY t) #update action
7: t← t+ 1 #next stage
8: end for
3. Y ti ∈ Yi is the signal received by player i at stage t, assumed through-
out to satisfy the unbiasedness assumption E[Y ti | F t−1] = vti(Xt)
(cf. 2.3).
4. γti is a player-specific step-size sequence (assumed nonincreasing).
5. Pi:Xi×Yi → Xi denotes the prox-mapping of player i, itself derived
from some distance-generating function hi:Xi → R as above.
In particular, unless explicitly mentioned otherwise, all repeated game

















For concreteness, we also provide a pseudocode implementation of this
prox-based learning protocol as Algorithm 2 above.
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2.6 Explicit regret bounds
We show in this section how Theorem 2.4.3 can be applied in the specific
case where the algorithm of each player is the prox strategy described
in the previous section. For this, we have to understand the static regret
suffered by this strategy. Given the time varying game {ut}t≥1, the
signal process {Y ti }t≥1 of the form (2.12), as well as step-size sequence
{γti}t≥1 and a prox-mapping Pi. Suppose that each player executes
Algorithm 2. This induces a repeated game strategy {Xt}t∈N. Our
analysis of dynamic regret of this strategy starts with a basic inequality
bounding the regret of any fixed action over a finite time horizon. Re-
sults of this flavor are well-known form the online learning literature.
Still, for the sake of being self-contained, we present a quick proof.
Lemma 2.6.1. Consider a time-varying game Gt, t = 1, 2, . . . . For any T ≥ 1
and constant step size γi, the regret of Algorithm 2 relative to the fixed action



















D[Xi, hi] := maxXi
hi −minXi
hi. (2.56)
Proof. The basic starting point of our analysis is the following inequality,
taken from inequality 2.135 in Appendix 2.9.1 :
Dhi(xi, X
t+1




‖Y ti ‖2∗. (2.57)
Using the decomposition of the signal at stage t and rearranging the
above expression yields
〈γtivti(Xt), xi −Xti 〉 ≤ Dhi(xi, Xti )−Dhi(xi, Xt+1i )
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‖Y ti ‖2∗. (2.58)
Taking a constant step-size γti = γi and telescoping gives
T∑
t=1
















‖Y ti ‖2∗. (2.59)
Since X1i ∈ argminxi∈Xi hi(xi) and the Bregman divergence is non-
negative, we arrive at
T∑
t=1


























where the last line uses equality (2.127).
This step of the proof is very much inspired from recent results on
Mirror-Prox algorithms [86, 57]. As a result of this, we will easily obtain
a bound on the static regret in expectation. In the next step we will use
this bound, and some basic facts from martingale theory to prove a
sequence of concentration result on the gap function, and a-fortiori, the
static regret.
2.6.1 Bounding expected cumulative regret
In order to bound the static regret of the prox-strategy, we recall the
basic assumptions we imposed on the observational noise of the players’
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feedback signal. From (2.17b), we get the existence of a positive scalar
σi such that
E[‖U ti ‖2∗|F t−1] ≤ σ2i , (2.61)
holds for all i ∈ N . Given the signal structure Y ti = vti(Xt) + U ti ,
condition (2.61) and the gradient bound (2.10) implies that
E[‖Y ti ‖2∗|F t−1] ≤ 2G2i + 2σ2i =: M2i ∀t ≥ 1, i ∈ N . (2.62)
Under these assumptions we prove a sublinear bound on the expected
regret.
Proposition 2.6.2. For fixed T ≥ 1, assume that player i executes Algorithm








Then, we have the following regret bound over the time window
T = {1, . . . , T}:
E[Regi(T )] ≤ 2
√
T (M2i + σ
2
i )D[Xi;hi]/Ki. (2.64)
In particular, lim supT→∞ E[Regi(T )/T ] = 0.
Before proving this result, let us emphasize that Proposition 2.6.2 pro-
vides an upper bound on the expected regret, and not on the pseudo-
regret, as commonly done in the literature (see e.g. [12]). Pseudo-regret
is a much weaker notion of regret, and usually it is much easier to
obtain bounds on the pseudo-regret.
Proof. By (2.58), we have
〈γtivti(Xt), xi −Xti 〉 ≤ Dhi(xi, Xti )−Dhi(xi, Xt+1i )− 〈γtiU ti , xi −Xti 〉
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‖Y ti ‖2∗. (2.65)












A simple induction argument shows that the process {Zti}t≥1 is {F ti }t≥1
measurable, for all i ∈ N . Using this process, the previous inequality
can be rewritten as
〈γtivti(Xt), xi −Xti 〉 ≤ Dhi(xi, Xti )−Dhi(xi, Xt+1i )




‖Y ti ‖2∗ + 〈γtiU ti , Zti − xi〉.
(2.67)
Hence, after summing and telescoping, we arrive at the bound
T∑
t=1
〈γtivti(Xt), xi −Xti 〉 ≤ Dhi(xi, X1)−Dhi(xi, XT+1i ) +
T∑
t=1







‖Y ti ‖2∗ +
T∑
t=1
〈γtiU ti , Zti − xi〉. (2.68)
By Lemma 2.9.2 , proven in Appendix 2.9.1 , shows that
T∑
t=1





‖γtiU ti ‖2∗. (2.69)
Combining these two inequalities gives
T∑
t=1
〈γtivti(Xt), xi −Xti 〉 ≤ 2Dhi(xi, X1i ) +
T∑
t=1









‖Y ti ‖2∗ + ‖U ti ‖2∗
)
. (2.70)
In the case of a constant step-size γti = γi, this implies
T∑
t=1















‖Y ti ‖2∗ + ‖U ti ‖2∗
)
. (2.71)
Since X1i ∈ argminxi∈Xi hi(xi), taking the supremum over actions xi ∈
Xi on both sides of this inequality, and using (3.13), we conclude


















t=1〈U ti , Xti − Zti 〉 is a martingale with respect to the fil-





‖Y ti ‖2∗ + ‖U ti ‖2∗
)
is a non-negative submartin-
gale, with expected value bounded by T (M2i + σ
2
i ). Hence, taking
expectations on both sides, we obtain
















step-size in the previous display, we get
E[Regi(T )] ≤ E[Gapi(T )] ≤ 2
√
D[Xi, hi]T (M2i + σ2i )/Ki (2.75)
and our proof is complete.
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It is of course much more interesting to know how large the realized
regret of a player actually is. Based on the bound on the expected regret
derived in the proposition, a simple probabilistic bound on the mag-
nitude of the realized regret can be obtained via Markov’s inequality.
Indeed, for all ε > 0, we have







D[Xi, hi](M2i + σ2i )
KiT
. (2.76)
In Section 2.6.3 , we obtain a more refined bound on the regret under
slightly stronger assumptions on the distribution of the feedback
signal.
We close this section by remarking that in case where the feedback signal
is deterministic, the above bound on the expected regret immediately
delivers an O(
√
T )-bound for the realized regret.
Corollary 2.6.3. Consider the time-varying game with perfect gradient feed-
back signals, σi = 0 for all i ∈ N . Then
Regi(T ) ≤ 2
√
D[Xi, hi]TM2i /Ki. (2.77)
In particular, lim supT→∞Regi(T )/T = 0 for all i ∈ N .
2.6.2 Bounding expected dynamic regret
As an immediate consequence of Proposition 2.6.2, we are able to bound
the players’ expected dynamic regret via the decomposition Lemma
2.4.2. Recall that the key ingredients for this bound were (i) a restarting
procedure (Algorithm 1 ), and (ii) an algorithm guaranteeing sublinear
asymptotic behavior of the gap function. In this section we carry out
this program, using Algorithm 2 as the driving algorithm in players’
updating decisions.
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Let 1 ≤ ∆i ≤ T be a given batch size for blocks Ti,1, . . . , Ti,mi with
mi = dT/∆ie in order to realize Algorithm 1 , with Algorithm 2 to
update the action within each block. Denote the resulting repeated
game strategy by {Xt}1≤t≤T . Under this strategy, we can use Theorem
2.4.3 to obtain an immediate bound on the expected dynamic regret.
Proposition 2.6.4. Let T = {1, . . . , T}, and let xti ∈ Xi, t = 1, 2, . . . be a
test sequence enjoying the variation bound
Vari(T ;xTi ) ≤ V Ti ,
for some V Ti ≥ 1. Let {Xti}1≤t≤T be the strategy defined by Algorithm 1
with batch size ∆i = d(T/V Ti )2/3e, and subroutine Algorithm 2 to update the
actions within each block. Then we have
E[DynRegi(T , {xti}k∈N)] ≤ (3Ci + 2Gi)(V Ti )1/3T 2/3, (2.78)
where Ci = 2
√
D[Xi, hi](M2i + σ2i )Ki.
Proof. Partition the time window T into mi blocks Ti,1, . . . , Ti,mi of size
at most ∆i. Lemma 2.4.2 tells us that we can bound the dynamic regret
suffered by player i against an arbitrary sequence of test actions {xti}t≥1
as
DynRegi(T ; {xti}t≥1) ≤
mi∑
`=1
Gapi(Ti,`) +Gi∆i Var(T ; {xti}t≥1). (2.79)










1 ≤ ` < mi. (2.80)
Then, using equality (2.75) , we can bound the gap function of player i
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on the time window Ti,` as
E[Gapi(Ti,`)] ≤ 2
√
D[Xi, hi]∆i(M2i + σ2i )/Ki. (2.81)
Let {xti}k∈N be a test sequence satisfying Var(T ; {xti}t≥1) ≤ V Ti for all
T ≥ 1. Adding the bounds of the gap function on each block, we can
bound the expected dynamic regret under the prox-strategy with restart
as
E[DynRegi(T ; {xti}t≥1)] ≤ 2mi
√
D[Xi, hi]∆i(M2i + σ2i )/Ki +Gi∆iV Ti .
(2.82)
From here we continue as in the proof of Theorem 2.4.3.
2.6.3 High-Probability bounds
The previous results all gave us bounds on the expected regret. Of
course, in real-world applications of online learning, a player needs to
employ a strategy which guarantees not only a low (dynamic) regret on
average, but actually with high probability. To that end, in this section we
derive some concentration inequalities of the (static) regret suffered by
the prox-method. For the derivation of high-probability regret bounds,
we need to make more restrictive assumptions on the players’ observa-









A simple application of Jensen’s inequality shows that this implies that
the signal process {Y ti }t≥1 is bounded in L2(Ω,F ,P), as in equality 2.62.
Clearly, this assumption on the feedback imposes similar structure on
the observational noise process. Indeed, by definition, we have
‖U ti ‖2∗ = ‖Y ti − vti(Xt)‖2∗ ≤ 2‖Y ti ‖2∗ + 2‖vti(Xt)‖2∗. (2.84)
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Since
‖vti(Xt)‖∗ = ‖E[Y ti | F̂t]‖∗ ≤
√
E[‖Y ti ‖2∗ | F̂t] ≤M∗, (2.85)
we conclude that









This sub-Gaussian assumption on the observation noise is quite
common in stochastic optimization and statistics [86, 57], and therefore
provides a reasonable assumption on the driving stochastic forces. It
holds under isotropic Gaussian observation noise, but also for every
bounded noise distribution. It is a stronger assumption than (2.16b),
since it implies that the observational noise must have finite moments
of all orders greater or equal than 2.
We will use these exponential bounds to derive a concentration inequal-
ity for the static regret, formulated in the following Proposition, whose
proof is relegated to Appendix 2.9.2.
Proposition 2.6.5. For all T ≥ 1 and all ε ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least
1− ε, there exists a step-size policy {γti}1≤k≤T such that




2T log(2/ε)D[Xi, hi]/Ki, (2.88)
where Ωεi = 5(1 + log(2/ε))M
2
∗ /(2Ki).
2.7 Regret minimization and Nash equilibrium
In this section, we examine the equilibrium convergence properties of
the players’ long-run behavior in two distinct regimes: a) when the
sequence of stage games Gt encountered by the players evolves over
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time without converging; and b) when Gt converges to some limit game
G. In what follows, we will treat the process defining the time-varying
game as a “black box” and we will not scrutinize its origins in detail; we
do so in order to focus directly on the interplay between the fluctuations
of the stage game and the induced sequence of play.
2.7.1 Tracking Nash equilibria
We begin by considering the case where Gt evolves without converging.
Building on the discussion in 3.2 , we will assume in what follows that
each Gt is β-strongly monotone in the sense of (2.8), i.e.,
〈vt(x′)− vt(x), x′ − x〉 ≤ −β‖x′ − x‖2 (2.89)
for all t = 1, 2, . . . , and all x, x′ ∈ X . In particular, this implies that each
stage game Gt admits a unique Nash equilibrium, which we will denote
by x̂t. Then, to quantify the degree to which the players’ chosen actions
Xt ∈ X “track” the Nash equilibrium sequence x̂t over the window of




‖Xti − x̂ti‖2, (2.90)







‖Xt − x̂t‖2. (2.91)
By construction, if this error function grows sublinearly with the size
T = |T | of the window of play, the sequence Xt will be close to Nash
equilibrium for most of the time (as determined by the asymptotic
growth of err(T ) over time). That being said, it should be intuitively
clear that if the sequence of Nash equilibria varies arbitrarily from one
44
stage to the next, then there is no way of achieving err(T ) = o(T ).11 For
this reason, we will focus in what follows on time-varying games with
slowly-varying equilibria, i.e., such that
T−1∑
t=1
‖x̂t+1 − x̂t‖ = o(T ) as T →∞. (2.92)
Under this assumption we have:
Theorem 2.7.1. Let Gt ≡ Gt(N ,X , ut) be a sequence of strongly monotone
games. Assume further that the variation of each player’s equilibrium compo-
nent over the window of play T = {1, . . . , T} satisfies∑T−1t=1 ‖x̂t+1i − x̂ti‖ ≤
V Ti for some V
T
i > 0. Then, if players follow Algorithm 2 for batches of size
∆i = d(T/V Ti )2/3e (as per Algorithm 1 ) with step-size defined by equation
(2.80), we have
E[erri(T )] = O(T 2/3(V Ti )1/3) (2.93)
for all i ∈ N . In particular, if the sequence of stage equilibria is slowly-varying
in the sense of equation (2.92), we have E[err(T )] = o(T ) as T →∞.
Proof. Our proof strategy will be to leverage the dynamic regret min-
imization properties of the restart schedule of Algorithm 1 (cf. Theo-
rem 2.4.3). To that end, note first that, for every reference action pi ∈ Xi,
(2.8) and (2.89) yield
β‖Xti − x̂ti‖2 ≤ 〈vti(Xt), x̂ti −Xti 〉
≤ 〈vti(Xt), pi −Xti 〉+ 〈vti(Xt), x̂ti − pi〉. (2.94)
Now, letting Ti,` be a batch of size at most ∆i = d(T/V Ti )2/3e (as per the
restart procedure of Algorithm 1), we obtain the local error bound
∑
t∈Ti,`
β‖Xti − x̂ti‖2 ≤
∑
t∈Ti,`
〈vti(Xt), pi −Xti 〉+
∑
t∈Ti,`
〈vti(Xt), x̂ti − pi〉
11For a rigorous statement and proof in the single-player setting, see the recent paper
[7].
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〈vti(Xt), x̂ti − pi〉. (2.95)
Hence, writing τi,` = min Ti,` for the first index of batch Ti,` and taking
pi = x̂
τi,`
i as a reference action for the `-th batch, we can bound the
second term above as
∑
t∈Ti,`





≤ Gi∆i Var(Ti,`, x̂τi,`i ). (2.96)
as |Ti,`|≤ VT and maxt∈Ti,`‖x̂ti − x̂
Ti,`
i ‖ ≤ Var(Ti,`, x̂
τi,`
i ) by applying
several times the triangular inequality over the batch Ti,`. Then, taking
expectations and summing over all batches as in the proof of Lemma

















By Proposition 2.6.2 , we have Gapi(Ti,`) = O(∆1/2i ). Thus, with ∆i =
O((T/V Ti )2/3) and mi = O(T/∆i) = O(T 1/3(V Ti )2/3), we finally get
E[erri(T )] = O(mi∆i) +O(∆iV Ti )
= O(T 1/3(V Ti )2/3 · T 1/3(V Ti )−1/3) +O((T/V Ti )2/3 · V Ti )
= O(T 2/3(V Ti )1/3), (2.98)
as claimed. Our second assertion then follows by noting that
T 2/3(V Ti )
1/3 = o(T ) if V Ti = o(T ).
Note that the strategy used to bound the tracking error depends on
the variation of the sequence of Nash equilibria of each stage game
Gt. We emphasize that this does not mean that the players actually
know this precise variation: it suffices to have a bound thereof (even
pessimistic). For instance, such information could be available to a
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player who knows that the sequence of stage games encountered comes
from a family of games that follow some sufficiently slow variation, but
not the exact realization of the game (and, much less, their equilibria). It
thus follows to reason that a sharper bound of this form leads to a better
tracking error (as evidenced by the (V Ti )
1/3 dependence of erri(T ) on
the variation bound V Ti ).
2.7.2 Convergence to Nash equilibrium
We now turn to the case where the sequence of stage games
Gt ≡ Gt(N ,X , ut) converges to some (monotone) limit game
G ≡ G(N ,X , u).12 Formally, it will be convenient to characterize this




i.e., via the maximum difference in (individual) payoff gradients be-
tween stage t and the limit t→∞. We will then say that the sequence




Bti → 0 as t→ 0. (2.100)
The reason for defining the convergence of a sequence of games in terms
of payoff gradients instead of payoff functions is twofold: First, if the
payoff functions of a game are perturbed by arbitrary (player-specific)
constants, the game’s equilibrium points will remain unchanged, but
the corresponding payoff differences may be large (so ‖uti − ui‖ may
fail to converge to 0 as t→∞). Second, the variational characterization
(2.4) shows that the Nash equilibria of a (concave) game are actually
determined by the players’ individual payoff gradients, not their payoff
functions; as such, characterizing the convergence of a sequence of
12To be clear, we are not assuming that each stage game Gt is a priori monotone.
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stage games in terms of payoff gradients is closer to the true primitives
that define equilibrium behavior in our setting.
Now, as in the previous section, we will focus on the prox-based learn-
ing protocol outlined in Algorithm 2. However, since we are now
interested in the convergence of the generated sequence of play Xt to
a specific target point in X , we will require in what follows that the
Bregman divergence of h =
∑
i hi satisfy the additional “reciprocity”
condition
xt → p whenever Dh(p, xt)→ 0, (RC)
for every sequence of actions xt ∈ X ◦ ≡ ∏iX ◦i . This requirement is
known in the literature as “Bregman reciprocity” [16, 76] and, essentially,
it ensures that the sublevel sets of Dh(p, ·) constitute a neighborhood
basis for p in X , i.e., every Bregman zone of the form Dε(p) ≡ {x ∈ X :
Dh(p, x) ≤ ε} contains some δ-ball Bδ(p) = {x ∈ X : ‖p− x‖ ≤ δ}.13
With all this at hand, our main Nash equilibrium convergence result in
this setting is as follows:
Theorem 2.7.2. Let Gt ≡ Gt(N ,X , ut) be a sequence of concave games
converging to a strictly monotone limit game G ≡ G(N ,X , u) in the sense
of (2.100). Assume further that each player follows Algorithm 2 with a prox-










Then, with probability 1, the sequence of realized actions Xt converges to the
(necessarily unique) Nash equilibrium x̂ of the limit game G.







i <∞ should be interpreted as a bound on
13The converse to this condition (i.e., that Xt → p whenever Dh(p,Xt) → 0) holds
automatically as a simple consequence of the fact that Dh(p, x) ≥ (K/2)‖p− x‖2
(cf. 2.9.1).
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how slow the convergence of Gt can be in order for convergence to equi-
librium to be guaranteed. For instance, as long as Bt = O(1/(log t)ε) for
some ε > 0, the step-size conditions (2.101) can all be satisfied by taking
γt ∝ 1/(t log t). Second, as in Theorem 2.7.1 , the players of the game
are not required to know the exact value of Bti (which would require a
very detailed knowledge of the game at hand): as in all our variation
results so far, it suffices to work with an upper bound thereof (even a
loose, pessimistic one).
Our proof strategy will be based on two intermediate results, both of
independent interest. First, we will show that the sequence of generated
actions converges (a.s.) to a level set of the Bregman divergence Dh(x̂, ·)
relative to x̂. Subsequently, we show that Xt cannot remain a bounded
distance away from x̂ for all sufficiently large t. Combining these results
will then suffice to show that Xt can only converge to the zero-level set
of the Bregman divergence, i.e., limt→∞Xt = x̂.
We begin by establishing the convergence of Xt to a level set of the
Bregman divergence:
Proposition 2.7.3. With assumptions as in 2.7.2 , the Bregman divergence
Dh(x̂, X
t) converges (a.s.) to a random variable D∞ with P(D∞ <∞) = 1.
Proof. To begin, it will be convenient to decompose the signal process
Y ti as
Y ti = v
t
i(X
t) + U ti = vi(X
t) + U ti + b
t
i, (2.102)
where we have set bti = v
t
i(X
t)− vi(Xt). Then, letting Dti = Dhi(x̂i, Xti ),
the descent inequality (2.58) for the Bregman divergence readily yields




≤ Dti + γt〈vi(Xt), Xti − x̂i〉+ γt〈U ti , Xti − x̂i〉 (2.103)
+ γt〈bti, Xti − x̂i〉+
(γt)2
2Ki
‖Y ti ‖2∗ (2.104)
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≤ Dti + γtξti + γtβti +
(γt)2
2Ki
‖Y ti ‖2∗, (2.105)
where, in the third line, we have set ξti = 〈U ti , Xti − x̂i〉 and βti =
〈bti, Xti − x̂i〉, and we used the fact that x̂ is a Nash equilibrium of the
limit game G (implying in turn that 〈vi(xi), xi − x̂i〉 ≤ 0 for all xi ∈ Xi
and all i ∈ N ). Thus, taking expectations, we obtain:










≤ Dti + γt E[‖bti‖∗‖Xti − x̂i‖ |F t−1] +
(γt)2
2K
E[‖Y ti ‖2∗ | F t−1]




where a) in the second line, we used the fact that Xt is predictable
relative to F t, the definition of βti , and the fact that E[U t | F t−1] = 0;
and b) in the last line, we used (2.17b) and the definition of Bti .
To proceed, let εti = γ
tBti diam(Xi) + 12K (γt)2M2i , so the last line of
(2.106) can be written as
E[Dt+1i | F t−1] ≤ Dti + εti. (2.107)






i . Then, taking
expectations yields
















∞ by the step-size assumption (2.101), we also get E[ζti ] ≤ E[ζ1i ] <∞,
i.e., ζti is bounded in L
1. Thus, by Doob’s (sub)martingale convergence
theorem, it follows that ζti converges almost surely to some random









i = 0 (again, by the step-size summability
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assumption), we conclude that Dti converges itself to ζi. Our claim then





Moving on, our next result shows that the sequence of play Xt gets
arbitrarily close to the Nash equilibrium x̂ of the limit game:
Proposition 2.7.4. With probability 1, there exists a (random) subsequence
Xtk of Xt which converges to x̂.
Proof. Our proof is by contradiction. To that end, suppose that, with
positive probability, the sequence of play Xt does not admit x̂ as a
limit point. Conditioning on this event, there exists a ball Bδ(x̂) such
that Xt /∈ Bδ(x̂) for all sufficiently large t, implying in turn that Xt
is contained in some compact set K ⊆ X such that x̂ 6∈ K. By (2.4)
and because the game is strictly monotone, we have 〈v(x), x− x̂〉 < 0
whenever x ∈ K. Therefore, by the continuity of v and the compactness
of K, there exists some c > 0 such that
〈v(x), x− x̂〉 ≤ −c for all x ∈ K. (2.109)
To proceed, letDt = Dh(x̂, Xt) as in the proof of 2.7.3. Then, telescoping
(2.105) yields the estimate
Dt+1 ≤ D1 +
t∑
s=1













where the strong convexity modulus K is defined as K = miniKi,
and, as in the proof of Proposition 2.7.3, we set ξt = 〈U t, Xt − x̂〉 and
βt = 〈bt, Xt − x̂〉. Hence, setting St = ∑ts=1 γs and using (2.109), we
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We proceed to analyze this bound term-by-term:
• First, by definition, we have E[ξt | F t−1] = 0, so the second term




(γt)2 E[(ξt)2 | F t−1] ≤
∞∑
t=1





Therefore, by the law of large numbers for martingale difference




converges to 0 with probability 1.
• For the third term in the brackets of (2.111), we have


























= Rt + (γt)2 E[‖Y t‖2∗ | F t−1] ≥ Rt, (2.113)
i.e., Rt is a submartingale relative to F t. Furthermore, by the law
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of total expectation, we also have










i . In turn, this implies that R
t is uni-
formly bounded in L1 so, by Doob’s (sub)martingale convergence
theorem [45, Theorem 2.5], we conclude that Rt converges to
some (almost surely finite) random variable R∞ with E[R∞] <∞.
Consequently, we get limt→∞Rt/St = 0 with probability 1.
Combining all of the above, we infer that there exists some (possibly
random, but almost surely finite) t0 such that Dt ≤ D1 − c/2 · St for all
t ≥ t0. In turn, this implies that Dh(x̂, Xt)→ −∞with probability 1, a
contradiction. Going back to our original assumption, this shows that,
with probability 1, x̂ is a limit point of Xt, so our proof is complete.
With these two results at hand, we are finally in a position to prove our
Nash equilibrium convergence theorem:
Proof of 2.7.2 . Proposition 2.7.4 shows that, with probability 1, there
exists a (possibly random) subsequence tk such that Xtk → x̂. By the
reciprocity condition (RC), this implies that lim inft→∞Dh(x̂, Xt) = 0
(a.s.). However, since limt→∞Dh(x̂, Xt) exists with probability 1 by




t) = lim inf
t→∞
Dh(x̂, X
t) = 0 (2.115)
i.e., Xt converges to x̂.
2.7.3 Convergence in two-player zero-sum games
We close this section with a convergence result for two-player zero-sum
games in the spirit of time-average guarantees that are common in
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the online learning literature. To state it, assume as in 2.2.2 that the
sequence of stage games encountered by the players is determined by a
sequence of smooth, convex-concave saddle functions f t:X1 ×X2 → R
so that ut1 = −f t = −ut2. We then have:
Theorem 2.7.5. Let f t be a sequence of convex-concave saddle functions
converging to f :X1 ×X2 → R in the sense of (2.100). Assume further that

















s converges to the set of saddle-points of f .
Before discussing the proof of 2.7.5 , some remarks are in order:
Remark 1. It should be noted that, if the limit game is strictly mono-
tone (for instance, if f is strictly convex-concave), 2.7.5 is essentially
subsumed by 2.7.2 : if the sequence of play Xt converges to the game’s







s. On the other hand, this leaves open the
non-strict case: for instance, if the game at hand is the mixed exten-
sion of a two-player zero-sum finite game (i.e., f(x1, x2) = x>1 Ax2 for
some matrix A of appropriate dimensions), the limit game is not strictly
monotone, so Theorem 2.7.2 does not apply (but Theorem 2.7.5 does).
Remark 2. We should also note that 2.7.5 does not invoke the Bregman
reciprocity condition (RC). The reason for this is that the analysis of
the ergodic average is not as delicate as that of the actual sequence of
play, but this (technical) simplification comes at a price: specifically,
2.7.5 says little for the convergence of Xt. In fact, even in the static case
(f t = f for all t = 1, 2, . . . ), the sequence of chosen actions might be
recurrent or cycle around the game’s limit Nash equilibrium without
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converging [75, 78]: this is a qualitative difference in behavior which
cannot be detected by the convergence of X̄t.
We now proceed with the proof of 2.7.5:
Proof of 2.7.5 . Let x̂ ∈ X be a Nash equilibrium of the limit game in-
duced by f , and, as in the proof of 2.7.4 , let Dt = Dh(x̂, Xt). Then,
working as in 2.105 , we obtain the basic estimate




where we have set K = min{K1,K2}. Then, decomposing the input
signal Y t as in (2.102) and rearranging, we get:



































in the same way as in the proof of 2.7.4 (which has the same step-size
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≥ u1(x̂1, x̂2)− u1(X̄t1, x̂2) + u2(x̂1, x̂2)− u2(x̂1, X̄t2)
= f(X̄t1, x̂2)− f(x̂1, X̄t2). (2.122)
Therefore, combining all of the above, we conclude that




i.e., f(X̄t1, x̂2)− f(x̂1, X̄t2)→ 0 as t→∞. Since x̂ is a Nash equilibrium,
this shows that X̄t attains the value of f , i.e., X̄t converges itself to the
set of saddle-points of f , as claimed.
2.8 Concluding remarks
There are many interesting points for future research. First, we have
been very agnostic towards the data generating process of the game
problem. With an eye towards simulation based solution techniques,
it is important to study time-varying games generated by ergodic pro-
cesses in the spirit of [20]. For monotone variational inequality problems
subjected to Brownian noise, a first step in this direction has been done
by [77]. More effort is needed to understand the asymptotic properties
of the repeated game process in this approach, possibly also using dif-
ferent assumptions on the driving random process. We are currently
investigating this issue.
In view of applications to problems in engineering and control, the
study of a bona fide continuous-time version of the present approach is
also a priority. At a higher level, we have made many strong regularity
assumptions on the time-varying games in this chapter (concavity in
own action, and differentiability). Relaxing the smoothness of the
individual player function is an important extension of the present
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approach. Finally, introducing coupled constraints into the player’s
action set is an important and challenging extension of the present
framework, which is also currently under investigation.
2.9 Appendix
2.9.1 Prox-Mappings
In this appendix we collect some basic technical facts on the prox-
method. In the following we let C be a convex compact domain in a
finite-dimensional normed vector space (V, ‖·‖), and h: C → R be a
distance generating function with convexity parameter K. The corre-
sponding Bregman divergence is
Dh(x, x
′) = h(x)− h(x′)− 〈∇h(x′), x− x′〉 (2.124)
for x ∈ dom(h), x′ ∈ dom(h)◦. Define Θh(a) = maxx∈C Dh(a, x), and
xh = argmin{h(x) : x ∈ C}. (2.125)
Note that xh is uniquely defined thanks to the strong-convexity of h,
and we have
〈∇h(xh), a− xh〉 ≥ 0 (2.126)





h(x) =: D[C;h]. (2.127)
Furthermore, by K-strong convexity,
K
2






D[C, h] ∀x ∈ C, (2.129)
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P (x, y) = argmin
a∈A
{〈y, a− x〉+Dh(a, x)}.
Then
1. For all x ∈ A, the map V∗ 3 y 7→ P (x, y) is single-valued.
2. For all x ∈ A and all y, v ∈ V∗, ‖P (x, v)− P (x, y)‖ ≤ 1K ‖v − y‖∗.
3. For all a, x ∈ A and all y ∈ V∗, we have
Dh(a, P (x, y)) ≤ Dh(a, x) + 〈y, a− P (x, y)〉 −Dh(P (x, y), x).
(2.131)
Proof. 1. This is clear by strong convexity.
2. Let a = P (x, y) and b = P (x, v). The optimality conditions at
these points are
〈∇h(a)−∇h(x) + y, x′ − a〉 ≥ 0, (2.132)
and
〈∇h(b)−∇h(x) + v, x′ − b〉 ≥ 0 (2.133)
for all x′ ∈ X . Evaluating the first inequality at the point x′ = b
and the second inequality at the point x′ = a gives
〈∇h(a)−∇h(x) + y, b− a〉 ≥ 0,
〈∇h(b)−∇h(x) + v, b− a〉 ≤ 0.
Hence,
〈∇h(a)−∇h(x) + y, b− a〉 ≥ 〈∇h(b)−∇h(x) + v, b− a〉
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⇐⇒ 〈y − v, b− a〉 ≥ 〈∇h(b)−∇h(a), b− a〉 ≥ K‖a− b‖2
(2.134)
where the last inequality uses the K-strong convexity of the dis-
tance generating function h. Hence,
‖y − v‖∗ ≥ K‖a− b‖.
3. The three-point identity [16] gives
Dh(a, x)−Dh(a, c)−Dh(c, x) = 〈∇h(c)−∇h(x), a− c〉
Combined with the optimality condition satisfied by the point
c = P (x, y), we get
Dh(a, x)−Dh(a, P (x, y))−Dh(P (x, y), x)
= 〈∇h(P (x, y))−∇h(x), a− P (x, y)〉
≥ 〈−y, a− P (x, y)〉.
Rearranging gives the desired inequality.
2.131 provides the first step to derive regret bounds for the prox-method
as done in the main text. Using the Fenchel Young inequality






this inequality can be refined to
Dh(a, P (x, y))−Dh(a, x) ≤ 〈y, a− x〉+ 〈y, x− P (x, y)〉 −Dh(P (x, y), x)
≤ 〈y, a− x〉+ 1
2K
‖y‖2∗. (2.135)
The next Lemma provides a slight refinement of the previous one.
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Lemma 2.9.2. Let {vt}t∈N be a sequence in V∗. Define the process {Y t}t∈N
by
Y t+1 = P (Y t, vt), Y 1 ∈ C◦ given.
Then, for all T ≥ 1 and all a ∈ C◦, we have
T∑
t=1






Proof. From 2.9.1 and 2.135 , we get
Dh(a, Y




Rearranging and telescoping gives
T∑
t=1












The last inequality uses the non-negativity of the Bregman divergence.
2.9.2 Proof of Lemma
The purpose of this section is to prove 2.6.5 , under the assumption that











‖Y ti ‖2∗ + ‖U ti ‖2∗
)
, (2.136)





Then, for all constants C1, C2 > 0, we have































3‖Y ti ‖2∗ + 2M2∗
)
(2.139)









































i . Then, Jensen’s inequality shows that
14
E[exp(Φi,T /Γi,T )] ≤ exp(1).
Therefore, for all C1 > 0, Markov’s inequality readily implies
P(Φi,T ≥ (1 + C1)Γi,T ) = P(exp(Φi,T /Γi,T ) ≥ exp(1 + C1))
≤ exp(−1− C1)E [exp(Φi,T /Γi,T )]
≤ exp(−C1). (2.141)




i . Observe that
E[ξti | Ft−1] = 0 for all t ≥ 1. Therefore Ξi,T is a martingale with respect
to the filtration F := {Ft}t≥1, which is also bounded in L2(Ω,F ,F,P),
thanks to (2.87).
Via the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, the Ki-strong convexity of the
distance generating function, as well as eqs. (2.125) and (2.130), we see
that
|ξti | ≤ γti‖U ti ‖∗ · ‖Xti − Y ti ‖i
≤ γti‖U ti ‖∗
[
‖Xti − xhi‖i + ‖xhi − Y ti ‖i
]
14The convexity of the mapping x 7→ exp(x) shows the following: Let {at}t≥1, {bt}t≥1



























































For all t ≥ 1, denote by τ ti := 4γtiM∗
√













Since Ξi,t = Ξi,t−1 + ξti , we get for all δ > 0
E[exp(δΞi,t)] = E[exp(δΞi,t−1) exp(δξti)] = E[exp(δΞi,t−1)E[exp(δξti) | F̂t]]
Following [86], we see that for all δ > 0 and t ≥ 1






Proceeding by induction, we observe that for all δ > 0,














2, Markov’s inequality yields the
immediate bound
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Then, setting δ = C22Ψi,T yields
P(Ξi,T ≥ C2Ψi,T ) ≤ exp(−C22/2 + C22/4) = exp(−C22/4)
for all C2 > 0. Combining this with the bound (2.141), we conclude that
for all C1, C2 > 0,
P(Φi,T + Ξi,T ≥ (1 + C1)Γi,T + C2Ψi,T ) ≤ exp(−C1) + exp(−C22/4).
To see this, introduce the events E3 = {Ξi,T + Φi,T ≥ (1 + C1)Γi,T +
C2Ψi,T }, E1 = {Φi,T ≥ (1 + C1)Γi,T } and E2 = {Ξi,T ≥ C2Ψi,T }. Then
E3 ⊆ E1 ∪ E2, so that P(E3) ≤ P(E1 ∪ E2) ≤ P(E1) + P(E2).
Lemma 2.9.4. For C > 0, define
Qi,T (C) := 2D[Xi, hi] + (1 + C)Γi,T + 2
√
CΨi,T
















For all T ≥ 1 and for all ε ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1− ε, we have
Gapi(T ) ≤ Qi,T (log(2/ε)).
Proof. Observe that E[ξti | Ft−1] = 0 for all t ≥ 1. Therefore Ξi,T , defined
in (2.137), is a martingale with respect to the filtration F := {Ft}t≥1,
which is also bounded in L2(Ω,F ,F,P), thanks to (2.87).
2.70 implies that
Gapi(T ) ≤ 2D[Xi, hi] + Φi,T + Ξi,T ,
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so {Gapi(T ) ≥ Qi,T (C)} ⊆ {Φi,T + Ξi,T ≥ (1 + C)Γi,T + 2
√
CΨi,T }.
Consequently, from 2.9.3 , we deduce that for all C > 0,
P(Gapi(T ) ≥ Qi,T (C)) ≤ 2 exp(−C).
Choosing C = log(2/ε) proves our claim.
Proof of 2.6.5 . From the variational characterization (3.13) for the exter-
nal regret, the Prox-strategy with a constant step-size γti ≡ γi gives










(Φi,T + Ξi,T ).
Hence, for all ρ > 0,
{Regi(T ) ≥ ρ} ⊆ {Φi,T + Ξi,T ≥ γiρ− 2D[Xi, hi]}.
Therefore, choosing ρ = Qi,T (C)/γi we deduce from 2.138 that
P(Regi(T ) ≥ Qi,T (C)/γi)




Picking C = log(2/ε), for any ε ∈ (0, 1) fixed, we get the desired (1− ε)-


















, and optimizing the above expression with
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2TD[Xi, hi]Ωεi + 8M∗
√
2T log(2/ε)D[Xi, hi]/Ki.
This shows that, with probability at least 1− ε, we have
Regi(T ) ≤ 2
√
2TD[Xi, hi]Ωεi + 8M∗
√
2T log(2/ε)D[Xi, hi]/Ki




applications to dynamic user
equilibrium in traffic networks
In this Chapter1, we use a class of strongly convergent primal-dual
schemes for solving variational inequalities defined by a Lipschitz
continuous and pseudo-monotone map in infinite-dimensional Hilbert
spaces solve dynamic user equilibria network flows.
3.1 Introduction
Variational inequalities (VIs) are a flexible mathematical formulation
of many equilibrium problems in engineering, machine learning, op-
erations research and economics (see [25] for a masterful survey of
theory and applications of finite-dimensional VIs). Formulated on an
1This chapter is based on [22]. I would like to thank the referees for their helpful
comments and discussion.
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infinite-dimensional real Hilbert space, variational inequalities also
play a key role in the field of partial differential equations (PDEs) and
optimal control, with important applications in imaging, differential
equations, and network flows [60, 53]. This chapter is concerned with
the computation of dynamic user equilibria in traffic networks using an
algorithm which solves such variational inequalities.
3.1.1 Dynamic user equilibrium
Dynamic user equilibrium (DUE) is a widely studied form of
dynamic traffic assignment (DTA), in which road travelers engage in a
non-cooperative Nash game with departure time and route choices.
One characteristic feature of DTA is that it provides a "general
equilibrium" model whose aim is to predict departure rates, departure
times and route choices of travelers over a given time horizon. Exact
DTA models are built on two layers: (i) a game-theoretic formulation of
trip assignment, such as the dynamic extension of Wardrop’s first
principle [111]; (ii) a network flow model, which captures the physical
relationships between entry and exit flows, junction flows, link delay
and path delay. The latter is referred in the literature as dynamic network
loading (DNL). The DNL procedure is a manifestation of the physical
principles of traffic flows, and various formulation of DNL exist in the
literature, ranging from fluid models to differential equations. We
refer the reader to the survey [10] and the book [38] for an in-depth
treatment of this important subject. We focus in this paper on the
computation of DUE, leaving the network loading in the back. Section
3.4 gives a precise explanation how this division between the two
levels works. A key challenge in the algorithmic approach to DUE is
the usual lack of a closed-form expression of the delay operator. The
delay operator is the quantity of interest in DUE, since it informs us
about the latencies on the individual paths of the traffic network.
Indeed, as shown already in the seminal work [31], the delay operator
is the defining map in the VI approach of dynamic user equilibrium.
However, without detailed information on this map, it is impossible
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to make a-priori monotonicity statements, which are crucial in the
choice of numerical algorithms to solve the variational inequality. In
fact, even if an explicit expression for the delay operator is available,
it has been shown in [81] that strong monotonicity cannot hold for
general networks and DNL models. Hence, any numerical algorithm
guaranteeing strong convergence under a-priori weak monotonicity
assumptions marks a breakthrough in the applicability of DUE as a
predictive tool for traffic engineers.
The literature on DUE is huge, and naturally it is impossible to
give a fair representation of all available results. We therefore only
give a summary of those contributions which are the most related
to our work. In finite-dimensions, the connection between VIs and
traffic user equilibrium is classical (see e.g. [25]). Once the user
equilibrium problem is put into a dynamic setting, the natural
model domain is the space of path-flows, which are assumed to be
square-integrable functions satisfying a natural conservation condition.
To our knowledge, the VI formulation of dynamic flows over time
has been first presented in [31]. Departing from that work, the field
has grown substantially, and various numerical schemes have been
constructed to solve the resulting VI under different global regularity
and Lipschitz continuity assumptions on the involved operator.2 A
gradient projection method is studied in [48]. Weak convergence of
this method is known if the operator is Lipschitz continuous and
strongly monotone [4]. As noted in [51], relaxing strong monotonicity
assumptions could even lead to divergence of the algorithm. [64] blue
develops an alternating direction method under the assumption
that the delay operator is cocoercive. Sufficient for cocoercivity is
Lipschitz-continuity and monotonicity, so again we need to make
rather restrictive global monotonicity assumption. Assuming weaker
monotonicity conditions, the well-known extragradient scheme, due to
Korpelevich and Antipin [62, 2], has been employed in [65] to solve
for DUE. In [110] the weak convergence of the extragradient method
2In terms of numerical analysis, these papers can thus be seen to follow the classical
philosophy to first optimize, then discretize.
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is studied in some detail. A further drawback of the extragradient
method is that it requires two costly projection steps at each iteration,
making it a relatively unattractive method given our desire to have
schemes with computationally cheap iterations. [48] also discusses a
proximal-point algorithm, first studied by Martinet [71] and Rockafellar
[94], and the self-adaptive projection scheme of [46]. Again, without
assuming strong monotonicity, proximal-point methods are known to
converge only weakly [43], and the self-adaptive projection scheme has
been introduced in [46] in a finite-dimensional setting, making the
distinction between weak and strong convergence meaningless. In
light of the above survey, the following research question emerges:
Can we develop a numerical algorithm with computationally cheap iterations
and exhibiting strong convergence of the iterates under mild monotonicity
assumptions?
Dennis Meier gave in his PhD-thesis (the analysis is done in [22]) an
affirmative answer to this question. We will use his algorithms in this
chapter to compute dynamic user equilibria in traffic networks. The
rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we introduce
standard notation and concepts from variational analysis. Section 3.3
describes the numerical scheme. An extension of the basic scheme to an
adaptive algorithm is also discussed in that Section, showing that we
can even get rid of Lipschitz continuity assumptions when designing
the algorithm’s parameters. Section 3.4 reports numerical experiments
in solving dynamic user equilibria in standard test instances, and
compares our method with the projection-based algorithm described in
[32, 48, 47].
3.2 Preliminaries
We follow the standard notation as in [4]. Let N := {1, 2, . . .} be the set
of positive integers and N0 := {0} ∪ N the set of nonnegative integers.
Let H be a real separable Hilbert space with inner product 〈x, y〉 and
induced norm ‖x‖ :=
√
〈x, x〉. A sequence (xn)n∈N converges strongly
to a point x ∈ H if limn→∞‖xn−x‖ = 0. A sequence (xn)n∈N converges
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weakly to a point x ∈ H if, for every u ∈ H, 〈xn, u〉 → 〈x, u〉; in symbols
xn ⇀ x.
Let X ⊆ H be a closed convex nonempty subset. Define the normal
cone mapping by NCX (x) := {u ∈ H|〈u, y − x〉 ≤ 0 ∀y ∈ X} if
x ∈ X , and NCX (x) = ∅ otherwise. The Euclidean projector onto X is
defined as PX (x) := argminy∈X
1
2‖y − x‖2. It is well known that PX is
nonexpansive and the following property, taken from [42], hold.
Lemma 3.2.1. Let X be a nonempty closed convex subset of a real Hilbert
spaceH. Given x ∈ H and z ∈ X . Then
z = PX (x)⇐⇒ 〈x− z, z − y〉 ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ X . (3.1)
Definition 3.2.2. A mapping F : H → H is pseudo-monotone on X if for
all x, y ∈ X it holds
〈F (x), y − x〉 ≥ 0⇒ 〈F (y), y − x〉 ≥ 0 (3.2)
The mapping F : H → H is monotone on X if for all x, y ∈ X it holds
〈F (x)− F (y), x− y〉 ≥ 0. (3.3)
Clearly, pseudo-monotonicity is a weakened monotonicity assumption
providing enough structure to derive provably strongly convergent
algorithms. In particular, if F = ∇f is the gradient of a differentiable
real-valued function f : H → R, pseudo-monotonicty of F implies
pseudo-convexity of the function f and vice versa. Pseudo-convexity
is the classical assumption involved in existing proofs of economic
equilibria and Nash equilibria in games with continuous action spaces
[25].
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3.3 A strongly convergent algorithm for
pseudo-monotone VIs
We are given a mapping F : H → H, satisfying the following assump-
tions:
Assumption 1. F : H → H is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz
constant L > 0, and sequentially weak-to-weak continuous on bounded
subsets ofH.
Recall that weak-to-weak continuity requires that for every weakly
converging sequence xn ⇀ x, it follows that F (xn) ⇀ F (x) [4]. In
terms of regularity, we also rely on the following mild monotonicity
assumption on the map F :
Assumption 2. F : H → H is pseudo-monotone on X : For all x, y ∈ X it
holds
〈F (x), y − x〉 ≥ 0⇒ 〈F (y), y − x〉 ≥ 0. (3.4)
We present an algorithm which solves the Hilbert-space valued varia-
tional inequality VI(X , F ):
find x∗ ∈ H such that 〈F (x∗), x− x∗〉 ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ X . (3.5)
It is known that under Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, the solution set
of VI(X , F ), which is denoted by X∗, is a nonempty closed and convex
set (see [82] and [4]).
3.3.1 Algorithmic Setting
In this section we present two strongly convergent numerical schemes
for solving VI(X , F ) under Assumptions 1-2 introduced in the thesis of
Meier. The building block of this construction is the classical forward-
backward-forward algorithm proposed by Tseng [108], in the context
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of solving monotone inclusions. As is well known, the advantage of
Tseng’s splitting technique is that it allows us to treat monotone inclu-
sions for finding zeroes of the operator A+B, where A : H → 2H and
B : H → H are both maximally monotone and B is L-Lipschitz. Com-
pared to the celebrated forward-backward splitting, Tseng’s method
does not require cocoercivity of the single-valued operator B. When
applied to variational inequalities, the main advantage of the forward-
backward-forward method is that it requires only a single projection
step at each iteration, which makes the algorithm much more efficient
in practice relative to its close competitor the extragradient method of
[62].3 We first present a non-adaptive version of our strongly conver-
gent forward-backward-forward algorithm (Algorithm 3 ). This scheme
iteratively constructs a sequence (xk, rk, zk)k∈N0 ⊂ H×H×X , where
zk and rk are just the classical forward-backward-forward iterations. If
we would run the scheme only with these two iterative steps, the best
we can hope for is weak convergence of the iterates under the common
hypothesis that the map F is monotone. The innovative element of
the scheme of Meier is the additional extrapolation step generating
xk+1, which will be enforcing strong convergence of the trajectories to a
minimum norm solution of VI(X , F ). We would like to point out that
this modification of the forward-backward-forward scheme is much
simpler than the one presented in [107] since no hyperplane projection
subroutine is involved in our construction. In view of our objective
to develop numerical methods with cheap iterations, this is a notable
feature of the algorithmic approach of Meier, which is similar to that
of [107]. In the literature, there is another approach called bilevel that
is often used not only to obtain strong convergence to the least norm
element, but also to handle ill-posed problems (see, e.g. [18]). The main
theoretical result of the PhD-thesis of Meier reads then as follows:
Theorem 3.3.1. Suppose that Assumptions 1-2 are satisfied. Let (αk)k∈N0
and (βk)k∈N0 be two real sequences in (0, 1), such that (βk)k∈N0 ⊂ (α, 1−αk)
3See [8, 103, 9] for an in-depth discussion in stochastic and deterministic variational
inequality problems.
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Algorithm 3 FBF for VI(F,X ).
Require: step-size sequence γ ∈ (0, 1/L), map F : H →
H,
1: parameters (αk)k∈N0 , (βk)k∈N0 ⊂ (0, 1),
2: Initial point x0 ∈ X #initialization
3: while k = 0, 1, . . . , kmax do
4: obtain xk
5: if Stopping condition not satisfied then
6: Compute zk = PX [xk − γF (xk)]
7: Compute rk = zk + γ(F (xk)− F (zk))
8: Update xk+1 = (1− αk − βk)xk + βkrk.
9: else
10: Stop and report xk as the solution
11: end if
12: end while







Then the sequence (xk)k∈N0 generated by Algorithm 3 converges strongly to
p ∈ X∗, where p = argmin{‖z‖: z ∈ X∗}.
Beside excellent convergence properties and computationally cheap
iterations, Algorithm 3 requires knowledge of the Lipschitz constant of
the map F . In practice we usually have no information about such a
global quantity, making the applicability of Algorithm 3 questionable.
Fortunately, we can circumvent this annoying strong assumption by
constructing a simple adaptive step-size policy relying on evaluations
of the function F only, without requesting explicit knowledge of the
Lipschitz constant. Specifically, let us consider a sequence (γk)k∈N0 ,
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Algorithm 4 FBF for VI(F,X ) adaptative step-size.
Require: step-size sequence γ0 > 0, map F : H → H,
1: parameters ρ ∈ (0, 1), (αk)k∈N0 , (βk)k∈N0 ⊂ (0, 1).
Ensure: Minimal norm solution x∗ ∈ X∗ of VI(X , F ).
2: Initial point x0 ∈ X #initialization
3: while k = 0, 1, . . . , kmax do
4: obtain xk
5: if Stopping condition not satisfied then
6: Compute zk = PX [xk − γkF (xk)]
7: Compute rk = zk + γk(F (x
k)− F (zk))
8: Update xk+1 = (1− αk − βk)xk + βkrk.
9: Update new step-size γk+1 by (3.7).
10: else









‖F (zk)−F (xk)‖ , γk
}
if F (zk)− F (xk) 6= 0,
γk otherwise.
(3.7)
The parameters ρ ∈ (0, 1) and γ0 are chosen at the beginning of the
scheme by the user. It is clear that (γk)k∈N0 is non-increasing and






. This implies that the sequence






. Replacing in Al-
gorithm 3 the constant step-size γ by the sequence (γk)k∈N0 , leads us
directly an adaptive forward-backward-forward scheme, precisely de-
fined in Algorithm 4. This adaptive stepsizes were also proposed in
[41] for solving maximal monotone inclusion problem.
Theorem 3.3.2. Suppose that Assumptions 1-2 are satisfied. Let (αk)k∈N0
and (βk)k∈N0 be two real sequences in (0, 1), satisfying the same conditions
as in Theorem 3.3.1. Let (γk)k∈N0 be designed by the adaptive rule (3.7).
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Then the sequence (xk)k∈N0 generated by Algorithm 4 converges strongly to
p = argmin{‖z‖: z ∈ X∗}.
The proof of this Theorem only requires a simple twist of the proof of
Theorem 3.3.1 , and is given at the end of the next Section.
The proof of those theorems can be foudn in [22].
3.4 Application to computing dynamic user equilibria
In this section we apply the strongly-convergent forward-backward-
forward algorithm to compute dynamic user equilibria in two standard
test examples taken from the literature. Our description follows the
recent survey [32].
3.4.1 Problem Formulation
Let [t0, t1] be a fixed planning horizon. We are given a connected di-
rected graph G = (V,A) with finite set of vertices V , representing traffic
intersections (junctions) and arc set A, representing road segments.
A path p in the graph G is identified with a non-repeating finite se-
quence of arcs which connect a sequence of different vertices. Hence,
an arbitrary path p is identified with the list of edges incident to it, i.e.
p = {a1, a2, . . . , am}. The integer m = m(p) denotes the length of the
path p. We denote the set of all paths of interest by P , and setH := R|P|.
We are interested in paths which connect a set of distinguished vertices
acting as the origin-destination (o/d) pairs in our graph. We are given N
distinct o/d pairs denoted as w1, . . . , wN , where each wi = (oi, di) ∈ V .
CallW := {w1, . . . , wN}, and the set of paths connecting the o/d pair w
is denoted by Pw ⊆ P. For each o/d pair w ∈ W we are given a demand
Qw > 0; This represents the number of drivers who have to travel from
the origin to the destination described by w. For simplicity we assume
that this demand is exogenously given. The list Q = (Qw)w∈W is often
called the trip table. In DUE modeling, the single most crucial ingredient
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is the path delay operator, which maps a given vector of departure
rates (path flows) h to a vector of path travel times. We stipulate that
path flows are square integrable functions over the planning horizon,
so that hp ∈ L2([t0, t1];R+) and h = (hp; p ∈ P) ∈ H := L2([t0, t1];H).
To measure the delay of drivers on paths, we introduce the operator
D : H → H, h 7→ D(h), with the interpretation that Dp(t, h) is the path
travel time of a driver departing at time t from the origin of path p, and
following this path throughout. This operator is the result of a dynamic
network loading procedure, which is an integrated subroutine in the
dynamic traffic assignment problem. See [47] for further information.
On top of path delays, we consider penalty terms of the form ρ(t +
Dp(t, h) − TA), penalizing all arrival times different from the target
time TA (i.e. the usual time of a trip on the o/d. pair w). The function
ρ : [−∞,∞)→ [0,∞] should be monotonically increasing with ρ(x) > 0
for x > 0 and ρ(x) = 0 for x ≤ 0. Define the effective delay operator
as
Ψp(t, h) := Dp(t, h) + ρ(t+Dp(t, h)− TA). (3.8)
We thus obtain an operator Ψ : H → H, mapping each profile of path
departure rates h to effective delays Ψ(h) ∈ H.
We follow the perceived DUE literature, and stipulate that Wardrop’s
first principle holds: Users of the network aim to minimize their own
travel time, given the departure rates in the system. Thus, a user
equilibrium is envisaged, where the delays (interpreted as costs) of all
travelers in the same o/d pair are equal, and no traveler can lower
his/her costs by unilaterally switching to a different route. To put this
behavioral axiom into a mathematical framework, we first formulate
the meaning of "minimal costs" in the present Hilbert space setting.
Recall the essential infimum of a measurable function g : [t0, t1]→ R as
essinf{g(t)|t ∈ [t0, t1]} = sup {x ∈ R|Leb({s ∈ [t0, t1] : g(s) < x}) = 0} ,
where Leb(·) denoted the Lebesgue measure on the real line. Given a
profile h ∈ H, define
νp(h) := essinf{Ψp(t, h)|t ∈ [t0, t1]} ∀p ∈ P, and (3.9)
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νw(h) := min
p∈Pw
νp(h) ∀w ∈ W. (3.10)
On top of minimal costs, we have to restrict the set of departure rates
to functions satisfying a basic flow conservation property. Specifically,















Definition 3.4.1. A profile of departure rates h∗ ∈ H is a dynamic user
equilibrium (DUE) if
(a) h∗ ∈ Λ, and
(b) h∗p(t) > 0⇒ Ψp(t, h∗) = νw(h∗).
In [31] it is observed that the definition of DUE can be formulated
equivalently as a variational inequality VI(Λ,Ψ): A flow h∗ ∈ Λ is a
DUE if
〈Ψ(h∗), h− h∗〉 ≥ 0 ∀h ∈ Λ (3.12)
3.4.2 A Strongly Convergent Forward-Backward-Forward
Scheme for DUE
Departing from (3.12), our aim is to solve the DUE problem by using the
strongly convergent forward-backward-forward scheme 3 . Adapting
this scheme to the usual notation in DUE, we arrive at Algorithm 5.
Some remarks on the implementation of this algorithm are in order.
First, it should be pointed out that Algorithm 5 requires two evaluations
of the delay operator Ψ. As already said, this operator is the outcome
of an inner procedure, solving the dynamic network loading part of the
model. Dynamic network loading is a separate computational step in
the dynamic traffic assignment problem. A very popular formulation
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Algorithm 5 FBF algorithm for computing DUE
Require: Graph G = (V,A) with o/d pairs W ⊂ V 2
step-size γ > 0
1: Trip Table (Qw)w∈W, parameters
(αk)k≥0, (βk)k≥0 ⊂ R+
Ensure: An approximate DUE h∗
2: Initial path flow h0 ∈ H #initialization
3: while k = 0, 1, . . . , kmax do
4: obtain hk
5: Compute εk =
‖hk+1−hk‖2
‖hk‖2
6: if εk > 10−4 then
7: Compute the effective path delays Ψp(t, hk)
8: Compute zk = PΛ[hk − γΨ(hk)]
9: Update Compute the effective path delays
Ψp(t, z
k)
10: Compute rk = zk + γ(Ψ(hk)−Ψ(zk))
11: Compute hk+1 = (1− αk − βk)hk + βkrk;
12: else
13: Stop and report hk = h∗ as the solution.
14: end if
15: end while
of dynamic network loading is the fluid dynamic approximation of
traffic flows, known as the Lighthill-Whitham-Richards (LWR) model.
We refer the interested reader to [38] for modeling approaches of the
dynamic network loading procedure. In case of the popular LWR
model evaluating the delay operator requires solving a coupled system
of hyperbolic partial differential equations for the traffic density. It is
clear that this procedure is the most costly step in the implementation
of Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 is, modulo the obvious change in notation, equivalent
to Algorithm 3 if the delay operator Ψ is Lipschitz continuous and
pseudo-monotone. Numerous computational algorithms for solving
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DUE problem were summarized in [47, Table 1]. For each solution
method, there are assumptions for which the convergence can be guar-
anteed. At the moment, the weakest conditions for DUE commuinity
is pseudo-monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity of the cost operator
Ψ. We refer the readers to [47] and extensive references quoted therein.
Currently, weak-to-strong continuity of the delay operator has been es-
tablished for many network loading models, including the LWR model.
See [37] for a state-of-the-art summary. As for monotonicity, global Lip-
schitz continuity has not been established rigorously for dynamic traffic
assignment models. Hence, like any other fixed-point algorithm ap-
plied to DUE, our application of the strongly convergence FBF scheme
has to be understood as a heuristic. However, in all numerical studies
we present below, the fixed-point iterations do meet the convergence
criterion (3.13).
3.4.3 Numerical Experiments
We implemented Algorithm 5 in MATLAB, building on the
open-source MATLAB package described in [47], and accessible under
https://github.com/DrKeHan/DTA. As DNL subroutine a numerical
implementation of the LWR model is used, generating the delay
operator Ψ(h) at flow profile h ∈ H. By adapting this toolbox to
Algorithm 5 , we compute dynamic user equilibria for the Nguyen and
the Sioux fall network (see Figure 3.1) and compare our results with the
projected gradient method. The parameters αk, βk and γ were chosen
for each instance separately to guarantee the best convergence. The
Nguyen network is a traffic network with 13 nodes connected by 19
links, and 4 o/d pairs. There are 24 paths to compute. The Sioux fall is
a significantly larger instance, consisting of 76 links, 24 nodes, 530
o/d pairs and 6,180 paths. We stop the algorithm if the relative gap is
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(24 nodes, 76 links, 24 zones)
Anaheim network
(416 nodes, 914 links, 38 zones)
Chicago sketch network
(933 nodes, 2950 links, 387 zones)






























Figure 2: The four test networks for DUE algorithms.
All the computations reported in this section were performed using the MATLAB (R2017b)
package on a standard desktop with Intel i5 processor and 8 GB of RAM.
5.1 Performance of the fixed-point algorithm





where hk denotes the path departure vector in the k-th iteration. The threshold ✏ is set to be
10 4 for the Nguyen and Sioux Falls networks, and 10 3 for the Anaheim and Chicago Sketch
networks. These di↵erent thresholds were chosen to accommodate the varying convergence
performances of the algorithm on di↵erent networks (see Figure 3).
15
Figure 3.1: The Nguyen and Sioux Falls network.
This measure can be interpreted as the iteration complexity of the al-
gorithm employed. Figure 3.2 shows the relative gaps for the Nguyen
and the Sioux fall networks until the stopping criterion is reached. It
can be seen from this Figure that both methods have a similar iteration
complexity, with a slight tendency favoring our FBF approach. Fig-
ure 3.3 shows the path departure rates as well as the corresponding
effective path delays. We observe that the departure rates are nonzero
only when the corresponding effective delays are equal and minimum,
which conforms to the notion of DUE. To rigorously assess the quality
of obtained DUE solutions, we define the gap fun tion between each
o/d pair w ∈ W as
Γw = max{Ψp(h∗, t), t ∈ [t0, t1], p ∈ Pw such that h∗p(t) > 0}
−min{Ψp(h∗, t), t ∈ [t0, t1], p ∈ Pw such that h∗p(t) > 0} (3.14)
In an exact DUE, we should have Γw = 0 for all w ∈ W . Figure 3.4
displays histograms of o/d gaps obtained by running FBF and the
projection method of [47] until the stopping criterion is reached. It is
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(b) Sioux Fall Network



















































































































































































































































(b) Siuox Fall network
2
Figure 3.2: Relative gap (3.13) (called epsilon in the figure) computed under
the forward-backward iteration of [47] and Algorithm 5 , using the same
parameter values
































(b) Sioux Fall Network



















































































































































































































































(b) Siuox Fall network
2
Figure 3.3: Path departure rates and corresponding effective path delays of
selected paths in the DUE solutions.
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0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2
O-D gap FBF (up), FB (down)
1
2
0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45
O-D gap FBF (up), FB (down)
1
2
Figure 3.4: Distributions of O-D gaps corresponding to the DUE solutions.
The O-D gap is calculated according to (3.14).
seen that most o/d gaps are varying between 0.1 and 0.3 for both test
instances, reflecting the early stopping of the method. We highlight
that Algorithm 5 beats the projection method in the Nguyen network
significantly, while it is comparable in overall performance in the Sioux
fall network, and at the same time is a strongly convergent method.
This provides strong evidence for the good performance of our scheme.
3.5 Conclusions and perspectives
In this chapter, we used a recent strongly convergent numerical scheme
for Hilbert-space valued variational inequality problems. We imple-
mented this algorithm in order to solve a challenging class of dynamic
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user equilibrium problems, and verified its competitiveness with state-
of-the-art solvers used in the transportation science literature. It seems
to be possible to extend the scheme to a larger class of variational




Competitive search games with a
moving target
In this Chapter 1 we introduce a discrete-time search game, in which
two players compete to find an object first. The object moves according
to a time-varying Markov chain on finitely many states. The players
know the Markov chain and the initial probability distribution of the
object, but do not observe the current state of the object. The players
are active in turns. The active player chooses a state, and this choice
is observed by the other player. If the object is in the chosen state, this
player wins and the game ends. Otherwise, the object moves according
to the Markov chain and the game continues at the next period.
We show that these games admit a value, and for any error-term ε > 0,
each player has a pure (subgame-perfect) ε-optimal strategy. Inter-
estingly, a 0-optimal strategy does not always exist. The ε-optimal
strategies are robust in the sense that they are 2ε-optimal on all finite
but sufficiently long horizons, and also 2ε-optimal in the discounted
1This chapter is based on [21]. I would like to thank Steve Alpern, Jérôme Renault
and Miquel Oliu-Barton for their helpful comments and discussion.
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version of the game provided that the discount factor is close to 1. We
derive results on the analytic and structural properties of the value and
the ε-optimal strategies. Moreover, we examine the performance of the
finite truncation strategies, which are easy to calculate and to imple-
ment. We devote special attention to the important time-homogeneous
case, where additional results hold.
4.1 Introduction
The field of search problems is one of the original disciplines of Op-
erations Research. In the basic settings, the searcher’s goal is to find
a hidden object, also called the target, with maximal probability or as
soon as possible. By now, the field of search problems has evolved into
a wide range of models. The models in the literature differ from each
other by the characteristics of the searchers and of the objects. Concern-
ing objects, there might be one or several objects, mobile or not, and
they might have no aim or their aim is to not be found. Concerning the
searchers, there might be one or more. When there is only one searcher,
the searcher faces an optimization problem. When there are more than
one searcher, searchers might be cooperative or not. If the searchers
cooperate, their aim is similar to the settings with one player: they
might want to minimize the expected time of search, the worst time, or
some search cost function. If the searchers do not cooperate, the prob-
lem becomes a search game with at least two strategic non-cooperative
players, and hence game theoretic solution concepts and arguments
will play an important role. For an introduction to search games, we
refer to [1], [35], 2010, 2013, [39], and for surveys see [6] and [55].
We introduce a competitive search game, played at discrete periods in
N. An object is moving according to a time-varying Markov chain on
finitely many states. Two players compete to find the object first. They
both know the Markov chain and the initial probability distribution
of the object, but do not observe the current state of the object. Player
1 is active at odd periods, and player 2 is active at even periods. The
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active player chooses a state, and this choice is observed by the other
player. If the object is in the chosen state, this player wins and the game
ends. Otherwise, the object moves according to the Markov chain and
the game continues at the next period. If the object is never found, the
game lasts indefinitely. In that case, neither player wins.
When the active player chooses a state, he needs to take two opposing
effects into account. First, if the object is at the chosen state, then he
wins immediately. This aspect makes choosing states favorable where
the object is located with a high probability. Second, if the object is not
at the chosen state, then knowing this, the opponent gains information:
the opponent can calculate the conditional probability distribution
of the location of the object at the next period. This aspect makes
choosing states favorable where, on condition that the object not being
there, the induced conditional distribution at the next period disfavors
the opponent. In particular, this conditional distribution should not
be too informative, and for example it should not place too high a
probability on a state. Clearly, in some cases there is no state that would
be optimal for both scenarios at the same time, and hence the active
player somehow needs to aggregate the two scenarios in order to make
a choice.
Each player’s goal is to maximize the probability to win the game,
that is, to find the object first. In our model, we do not assume that
the players take into account the period when the object is found. Of
course, in most cases, maximizing the probability to win will entail at
least partially that each player would prefer to find the object at earlier
periods, thereby preventing the other player from finding the object. We
refer to Section 4.5 on the finite horizon and on the discounted versions
of the search game, where the period when the object is found also
matters.
The two players have opposite interests, up to the event when the object
is never found. More precisely, each player’s preferred outcome is that
he finds the object, but he is indifferent between the outcome that the
other player finds the object and the outcome that the object is never
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found. As we will see, the possibility that neither player finds the object
will only have minor role, and hence the two players have essentially
opposite interests in the search game.
Main results. Our main results can be summarized as follows.
[1] We study the existence of ε-equilibria. A strategy profile is called
an ε-equilibrium if neither player can increase his expected payoff by
more than ε with a unilateral deviation. We prove that each competitive
search game admits an ε-equilibrium in pure strategies, for all error-
terms ε > 0 (cf. Theorem 4.3.2 and for subgame-perfect ε-strategies cf.
Proposition 4.5.1). The proof is based on topological properties of the
game. Interestingly, a 0-equilibrium does not always exist, not even in
mixed strategies. We demonstrate it with two different examples (cf.
Examples 4.3.1 and 4.3.2).
[2] We examine the properties of ε-equilibria. We show that in each
ε-equilibrium, the object is eventually found with probability at least
1 − ε · |S|, where |S| is the number of states (cf. Lemma 4.4.1), and
that the set of ε-equilibrium payoffs converge to a singleton (v, 1− v),
with v ∈ [ 1|S| , 1] as ε vanishes (cf. Proposition 4.4.2 and Theorem 4.4.3).
This implies that, in such search games, the two players have essen-
tially opposite interests, and that we may consider v to be the value of
the game and the strategies of ε-equilibria as ε-optimal strategies (cf.
Definition 4.4.4 and Proposition 4.4.5).
[3] We prove that the ε-optimal strategies are robust in the following
sense: they are 2ε-optimal if the horizon of the game is finite but suf-
ficiently long (cf. Theorem 4.6.2), and they are also 2ε-optimal in the
discounted version of the game, provided that the discount factor is
close to 1 (cf. Theorem 4.6.3).
[4] We investigate the functional and structural properties of the value
and the ε-optimal strategies (cf. Theorems 4.8.3, 4.8.4 and 4.5.2). In par-
ticular, we consider the set of probability distributions for the location
of the object where choosing a particular state is optimal, and show that
this set is star-shaped.
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[5] Since the ε-optimal strategies may have a complex structure and
may be difficult to identify, we examine the finite truncation strategies,
which maximize the probability to win in a finite number of periods.
We show that each finite truncation strategy, provided that the horizon
of the truncation is sufficiently long, is ε-optimal in the search game on
the infinite horizon (cf Theorem 4.6.2). Note that the finite truncation
strategies are easy to calculate by backward induction and only require
finite memory.
[6] We devote attention to the special case when the Markov chain
is time-homogenous (cf. Section 4.5.3), as time-homogenous Markov
chains are well studied in the literature of Markov chains and frequently
used in applications. For time-homogenous Markov chains, we prove
additional results. In particular, if the initial probability distribution of
the object is an invariant distribution of the time-homogenous Markov
chain, then the value is at least 1/2, so player 1 has a weak advantage
(cf. Proposition 4.5.3). Moreover, if the time-homogenous Markov chain
is irreducible and aperiodic, then the game admits a 0-equilibrium in
pure strategies (cf. Theorem 4.5.4).
Related literature. Discrete search problems with a moving object have
been widely investigated. [91], [98], [19] and [58] study the two-state
problem. Assuming perfect detection, [84] investigates the three-state
problem. [11] considers the search for a target with Markov motion in
discrete time and space using an exponential detection function. He
provides a necessary and sufficient condition for an optimal search plan
and an efficient iterative algorithm for generating optimal plans. [112]
studies a discrete effort analogue of [11], in which searchers decide the
effort they want to invest in order to find the object at each location they
visit. General necessary and sufficient conditions which extend Brown’s
results to an arbitrary stochastic process for any mixture of discrete
and continuous time and space are given in [104]. More recently, [40]
study a hide-search game in a random graph, that is a graph in which
each edge is available at each period with a positive probability. For
extensive surveys, see [6] and [55].
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Most of the search games focus on the case of one searcher, or several co-
operative searchers. Some problems with several cooperative searchers
and one or several moving targets are mentioned in the book of [105],
where some algorithms are also studied to solve those problems. To
the best of our knowledge, only two models consider several compet-
itive searchers. [83] investigates a non-zero-sum game in which two
searchers compete with each other for quicker detection of an object
hidden in one of n boxes, with exponential detection functions. Each
player wishes to maximize the probability that he detects the object
before the opponent detects it. The author shows the existence of an
equilibrium point of the form of a solution of simultaneous differential
equations, and gets explicit solution results showing that both players
have the same equilibrium strategy even though the detection rates
are different. [27] investigates the problem in which an agent has to
find an object that moves between two locations according to a discrete
Markov process, with the additional costless option to wait instead of
searching. They find a unique optimal strategy characterized by two
thresholds and show that, in a clear contrast with our model, it can
never be optimal to search the location with the lower probability of
containing the object. They also analyze the case of multiple agents,
where the agents not only compete against time but also against each
other in finding the object. They find different kinds of subgame perfect
equilibria.
As in [84] we investigate functional and structural properties of the
objective function. Nakai proved that the function that allocates to a
probability distribution the average number of looks before finding the
object is continuous, concave and enjoy some linear properties. They
also show that the optimal decision regions (see Section 4.5.2) are star-
convex. These properties have also been studied in [67] and in the PhD
thesis of [56].
Structure of the paper. In Section 4.2, we present the model. In Sec-
tion 4.3, we examine the existence of ε-equilibrium. In Section 4.4, we
argue that the two players have essentially opposite interests, and we
define the value and the notion of ε-optimal strategies. In Section 4.6,
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we present two relevant strategies, namely the finite truncation strategy
and the discounted strategy, and we prove payoff guarantees of those
strategies. In Section 4.5 we present additional results related to the
structural properties of the value, the subgame-perfect equilibria and
the case in which the Markov chain is time-homogeneous. Functional
properties of the value can be found in the Appendix. The conclusion is
in Section 4.7.
4.2 The model
The Game. We study a competitive search game G played by two
players. Let N = {1, 2, 3, . . .}. An object is moving according to a
discrete-time Markov chain (Xt)t∈N on a finite state space S. The initial
probability distribution of the object over the set S is given by p ∈ ∆(S),
and the transitions probabilities at period t are given by an S × S
transition matrix Pt = [Pt(i, j)](i,j)∈S2 , where Pt(i, j) is the probability
for the object to move from state i to state j at period t.
At each period t ∈ N, one of the players is active: At odd periods player
1 is the active player, and at even periods player 2 is the active player.
The active player chooses a state st ∈ S, which we call the action at
period t. If the object is at state Xt = st, then the active player finds the
object and wins the game. Otherwise, the object moves according to
the transition matrix Pt at time t and the game enters period t+ 1. We
assume that each player observes the actions chosen by his opponent.
The transition matrices (Pt)t∈N and the initial distribution p are known
to the players.
The aim of each player is to maximize the probability that he finds the
object first.
Histories. A history at period t ∈ N is a sequence ht = (s1, . . . , st−1) ∈
St−1 of past actions. By Ht = St−1 we denote the set of all histories
at period t. Note that H1 consists of the empty sequence. Let Nodd =
{1, 3, 5, . . .} and Neven = {2, 4, 6, . . .}. We denote by Hodd = ∪
t∈NoddHt
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the set of histories at odd periods, and by Heven = ∪t∈NevenHt the set
of histories at even periods. Note that at each history h, the players
can calculate the probability distribution for the current location of the
object.
Strategies. The action sets for both players are A1 = A2 = S. A
strategy σ = (σt)t∈Nodd for player 1 is a sequence of functions σt:Ht →
∆(S). The interpretation is that, at each period t ∈ Nodd, given the
history ht, the strategy σt chooses to search state s ∈ S with probability
σt(ht)(s). Similarly, a strategy τ = (τt)t∈Neven for player 2 is a sequence
of functions τt:Ht → ∆(S). We denote by Σ and T the set of strategies
for players 1 and 2, respectively. Note that Σ =
∏
h∈Hodd ∆(S) and
T = ∏h∈Heven ∆(S). We say that a strategy is pure if, for any history, it
places probability 1 on one action.
Winning probabilities. We define the stopping time2 of the
game by Θ = min{t ∈ N| st = Xt}. Consider a strategy
profile (σ, τ). The probability under (σ, τ) that player 1 wins




, and that player 2
wins is denoted by u2(σ, τ) = Pσ,τ (Θ ∈ Neven). Note that
u1(σ, τ) + u2(σ, τ) = 1 − Pσ,τ (Θ = ∞). If the object has not been
found before period t, and the history is ht, the continuation winning
probabilities from period t onward are denoted by u1(σ, τ)(ht) for
player 1 and u2(σ, τ)(ht) for player 2. 3
ε-Equilibrium. Let ε ≥ 0 be an error-term. A strategy σ for player
1 is an ε-best response against strategy τ for player 2 if u1(σ, τ) ≥
u1(σ
′, τ) − ε for every strategy σ′ of player 1. Similarly, a strategy
τ for player 2 is an ε-best response against strategy σ for player 1 if
u2(σ, τ) ≥ u2(σ, τ ′) − ε for every strategy τ ′ of player 2. A strategy
profile (σ, τ) is called an ε-equilibrium if σ is an ε-best response against
τ and τ is an ε-best response against σ.
2With the convention that min{∅} = +∞
3When we wish to emphasize the parameter p, we will write u1(σ, τ)(p) and
u2(σ, τ)(p).
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An alternative interpretation of the game. We call the previous game
Model [1]. We present an alternative model of this game in perfect
information. This model is useful in order to prove the existence of
ε-equilibrium for all ε > 0 (cf. Theorem 4.3.2).
Model [2] One could imagine that the game consists of two phases. In
the first phase the players choose actions. More precisely, in the first
phase player 1 chooses an action at odd periods and player 2 chooses an
action at even periods just as before. This results in an infinite sequence
of states (s1, s2, . . .). The set of infinite histories is S∞. Every pure
strategy profile (σ, τ) induces a unique infinite history h∞σ,τ ∈ S∞. In
a second phase, players receive a payoff. Now, for i = 1, 2, consider
the payoff function fi : S∞ → [0, 1] defined as follows. Consider an
infinite history (s1, s2, . . .). Take any pure strategy profile (σ, τ) such
that h∞σ,τ = (s1, s2, . . .) and define fi(s1, s2, . . .) = ui(σ, τ). Note that
this definition does not depend on the choice of (σ, τ). The goal of each
player is to maximize his payoff. Note that this is a game without an
object. This way we obtain a two-player perfect information game.
Discussion. We briefly argue that the above descriptions are equivalent.
For each pure strategy profile (σ, τ), for each player i = 1, 2, we have
ui(σ, τ) = fi(h
∞
σ,τ ). Then, a strategy profile in one of the models leads
to the same payoff in the other game. The difference is that Model
[1] is in imperfect information, as players only know the probability
distribution of the object, while Model [2] is in perfect information.
Model [1] gives a very clear, intuitive and concrete description of the
game. This is the reason why we usually work with this model in the
paper. Model [2] is used as a tool to prove existence of ε-equilibrium as
in Theorem 4.3.2.
4.3 Existence of equilibrium
In this section, we examine equilibria in competitive search games. In
the first subsection, we show that there are search games for which
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there exist no 0-equilibrium, not even in mixed strategies. From a
technical point of view, this is caused by discontinuity in the payoff
functions of the players. In the second subsection, we focus on the
notion of ε-equilibrium, where ε > 0 is an error-term, and prove that
each search game admits an ε-equilibrium in pure strategies, for all
ε > 0. We conclude the section by presenting an ε-equilibrium for the
games introduced in the first subsection.
4.3.1 Search games with no 0-equilibrium
Theorem 4.3.1. There exist time-homogeneous competitive search games
which admit no 0-equilibrium, not even in mixed strategies.
We provide two counter-examples: Example 4.3.1 and Example 4.3.2. A
common property of these counter-examples is that during the game
the players are forced to choose states where the probability of the
object is positive but converges to zero when t goes to infinity. In
Example 4.3.1, this happens within the class of transient states. In
contrast, in Example 4.3.2, there are multiple ergodic sets in the Markov
chain, and the players are forced to choose states in an ergodic set, even
when the probability that the object is in this ergodic set is very small.
Example 4.3.1. Consider the game in Figure 1. In this game, η ∈ (0, 1/4)
and the initial probability distribution is p = (q, q, 1/2 − q, 1/2 − q),
where q ∈ (0, 1/4). Notice that states 1 and 2 have the same transition
probabilities, and so do states 3 and 4. States 1 and 2 are transient,
whereas states 3 and 4 are absorbing.
We show that this game admits no 0-equilibrium. The intuition for this
claim is as follows. As we will show, it is not optimal for either player
to be the first one who chooses an absorbing state. As a consequence,
both players prefer to choose state 1 or state 2 and wait until the other
player chooses state 3 or state 4. However, if both players do so, they





















Figure 4.1: A game without 0-equilibrium.
Let σ = (σt)t∈Nodd be the strategy of player 1 defined as follows. For all





state 1 if t = 1,
state 3 if t ≥ 3 and ht(t− 1) = 4
or if t ≥ 3 and ht(t− 1) ∈ {1, 2} and ht(t− 2) 6= 3,
state 4 if t ≥ 3 and ht(t− 1) = 3
or if t ≥ 3 and ht(t− 1) ∈ {1, 2} and ht(t− 2) = 3,
where ht(t− 2) and ht(t− 1) are the second-to-last and the last actions
chosen under history ht, respectively. The idea is that from period 3
onward, σ chooses the most likely location of the object.
CLAIM 1: When player 1 uses σ he guarantees himself strictly more
than 1/2: u1(σ, τ) > 1/2 for every τ .
PROOF OF CLAIM 1: Under σ, player 1 looks at state 1 at period 1 and
finds the object with probability q at period 1. If the object is not found,
there is a positive probability that it is in state 2 at period 1, in which
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case it moves with positive probability to state 3 or state 4 at period
2. Then player 1 looks at state 3 or state 4 at period 3, depending on
the action of player 2 at period 2, and finds the object with probability
strictly greater than 1/2− q at period 3 no matter the action of player 2
at period 2.
CLAIM 2: Suppose that player 1 follows a strategy σ that looks at
state 3 or state 4 at period 1. Then player 2 has a strategy τ such that
u1(σ, τ) ≤ 1/2.
PROOF OF CLAIM 2: Let τ = (τt)t∈Neven be the strategy of player 2





state 1 if ht ∈ {1, 2}t−1,
state 3 if ht(t− 1) = 4
or if ht(t− 1) ∈ {1, 2} and ht(t− 2) = 4,
state 4 if ht(t− 1) = 3
or if ht(t− 1) ∈ {1, 2} and ht(t− 2) = 3.
The idea is that τ looks at state 1 if player 1 has never played state 3 or
state 4, and plays the most likely state otherwise. Assume for simplicity
that player 1 looks at state 3 at period 1. Assume that player 1 does not
find the object at period 1. The conditional probability for the object of









1/2− η · q
1/2 + q
,
which is strictly higher than 1/2 by our assumption that q < 1/4 and
η < 1/4. Then, in the continuation of the game, player 2 guarantees
strictly more than 1/2 if he looks at state 4 at period 2. If he does not,
player 2 will get strictly less than 1/2 if player 1 looks at state 4 at period
3. For similar reasons, if period 3 is reached, it is better for player 1 to
look at state 3. By repeating this argument, it is better for player 1 to
always look at state 3 against τ .
At period 1, player 1 finds the object with probability 1/2− q. At period
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2, player 2 finds the object with probability 1/2− q+ q(1− η). At period
3, player 1 finds the object with probability q(1 − η) + q(1 − η)η. At
period 4, player 2 finds the object with probability q(1−η)η+q(1−η)η2.
And so on. Then, player 1 finds the object with probability
1
2









So, by playing state 3 or state 4 at period 1, player 1 gets at most 1/2
against τ .
CLAIM 3: There is no 0-equilibrium.
PROOF OF CLAIM 3: Assume by way of contradiction that there is a 0-
equilibrium (σ′, τ ′). From CLAIM 1 and CLAIM 2, player 1 chooses state
1 or state 2 with probability 1 at period 1. In both cases, at period 2 the
current probability distribution is p2 = (qη, qη, 1/2−qη, 1/2−qη). Then,
at period 2, the game is similar to the original one, with a parameter
q′ = qη instead of q, which still satisfies q′ ∈ (0, 1/4), and where the
roles of the players are exchanged. Then, as τ is a 0-best response, it
follows from the previous reasoning that player 2 plays state 1 or state
2 with probability 1. By following this process recursively, players will
choose states 1 and 2 with probability 1 forever. This leads to the payoff
4
4−η2 for player 1. Then, player 1 has an incentive to deviate from σ
′ and
to choose state 3 at period 1 to get a payoff of at least 1/2− q > 4
4−η2 , a
contradiction.
Example 4.3.2. We present another game with time-homogeneous
Markov chain without a 0-equilibrium. Consider the
game in Figure 4.2. Let η ∈ (0, 1/6) and q ∈ (0, 1/3). Let
p = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, q(1 − η), qη, 1−q2 ,
1−q
2 ) be the initial probability
distribution. Notice that in this example there is no transient state.
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Figure 4.2: A game without a 0-equilibrium.
CLAIM 1: In any 0-equilibrium, at period 1 player 1 chooses state 6 with
probability 1.
PROOF OF CLAIM 1. If at period 1 player 1 looks at state 6, he guarantees
q(1− η) + 1−q2 > 1/2 by looking at period 3 at state 8 or 9.
If at period 1 player 1 looks at state 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 7, then player 2 can
find the object with probability q(1− η) at period 2 by looking at state
5 and with probability 1−q2 at period 4 by looking at state 8 or 9. As
q(1− η) + 1−q2 > 1/2, player 1 cannot get more than 1/2.
If at period 1 player 1 looks at state 8 (respectively, at state 9), then
player 2 can guarantee 1−q2 by looking at state 9 (respectively, at state
8) at period 2 and then q(1− η) · 23 by looking at state 1 at period 4. As
1−q
2 + q(1 − η) · 23 = 12 + q(1/6 − η) > 1/2 as η < 1/6, player 1 cannot
get more than 1/2.
So, there can be no 0-equilibrium in which at period 1 player 1 places a
positive probability on a state different from state 6.
CLAIM 2: In any 0-equilibrium, at period 2 player 2 chooses state 6 with
probability 1.
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PROOF OF CLAIM 2. From Claim 1, we know that in a 0-equilibrium,
player 1 looks at state 6 at period 1 with probability 1. If he does so, he
finds the object with probability q(1− η) at period 1. Then, under the
condition that the object is not found, the object was in state 7, 8 or 9 with
probability 1 at period 1 and the updated probability distribution of
the object is
(







object follows the transition matrix and the probability distribution of
the object at period 2 is
(
0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
η(1− η)q
1− q(1− η) ,
η2q
1− q(1− η) ,
1− q


















4 < q < 1/3 as 0 < η < 1/6 and
0 < q < 1/3. Thus, at period 2 player 2 is facing a similar situation as
player 1 at period 1. Claim 2 follows from Claim 1.
CLAIM 3: This game has no 0-equilibrium.
PROOF OF CLAIM 3. Assume by way of contradiction that the game
has a 0-equilibrium. From Claim 1, player 1 plays state 6 at period 1.
From Claim 2, player 2 plays state 6 at period 2. By repeating the same
reasoning as in Claim 2, in a 0-equilibrium, the active player looks at
state 6 with probability 1 at each period. Under this strategy profile, the
object is found with probability lower than q < 1−q2 . Hence, it would
be profitable for player 1 to deviate and look at state 6 at period 1. In
conclusion, there is no 0-equilibrium.
4.3.2 Existence of ε-equilibrium
In this subsection we are interested in the existence of ε-equilibrium,
where ε > 0. We show that there is an ε-equilibrium in pure strategies
for every search game, and for each ε > 0. The proof relies on existence
results for ε-equilibria in games with Borel measurable payoff functions
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(see the proof of Mertens and Neyman in [73]) and with lower semi-
continous payoff functions (see [28] and [29]).
Theorem 4.3.2. Each competitive search game admits an ε-equilibrium in
pure strategies, for all ε > 0.
Proof. Consider the Model [2] of a competitive search game in Section 4.2.
Note that
1. this is a multiplayer perfect-information game,
2. from Proposition 4.8.2 it follows that the payoffs are bounded and
lower semi-continuous.
Thus by applying Theorem 2.3 of [28] to the Model [2], the game admits
an ε-equilibrium in pure strategies for every ε > 0. It also follows from
[29] and [69].
Revisiting Examples 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. In view of Theorem 4.3.2, the
game in Example 4.3.1 has an ε-equilibrium in pure strategies for every
ε > 0. We now present an (subgame perfect) ε-equilibrium in pure
strategies of this game, for all ε > 0.
Let ε > 0. The idea of the ε-equilibrium in pure strategies described
here is to choose state 1 for a long time as long as the other player does
the same, and then to choose the most likely between state 3 or state 4
in the remaining game. More formally, for each n ∈ N, let (σn, τn) be
the pure strategy profile defined as follows. For all t ∈ N, for all history





state 1 if ht ∈ {1, 2}t−1 and t < n,
state 3 if ht(t− 1) = 4
or if ht(t− 1) ∈ {1, 2} and ht(t− 2) = 4
or if ht ∈ {1, 2}t−1 and t ≥ n,
state 4 if ht(t− 1) = 3
or if ht(t− 1) ∈ {1, 2} and ht(t− 2) = 3.
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Then, we define σnt (ht) = fnt (ht) for all t ∈ Nodd, and τnt (ht) = fnt (ht)
for all t ∈ Neven and all history ht at time t. The idea of σn and τn is
to look at state 1 until period n (if the other player does the same) and
from period n onward (or before if the other player deviates) to look at
the most likely state. We argue that if n ≥ ln ηq−ln 4εln 2−ln η then (σn, τn) is an
ε-equilibrium. For simplicity, we assume that n is odd.
It follows from the Claim 2 of the proof of Theorem 4.3.1 that τn is a
0-best-response against σn. It is then sufficient to show that σn is an
ε-best response against τn when n is large enough. From Claim 2 of
the proof of Theorem 4.3.1 it follows that a 0-best response against τn
is to follow the strategy σn+1, which only differs from σn at period n.
Under (σn, τn), player 1 finds the object at period 1 with probability





1 finds the object at period 3 with probability q.
(η
2
)2, and so on until




Then in the continuation game that starts at period n it follows from
the proof of Claim 2 in Theorem 4.3.1 that both players find the object
with probability 1/2. So, player 1 finds the object before period n
with probability q +
(η
2
)2 · q +
(η
2
)4 · q + . . . +
(η
2
)n−3 · q, player 2























. This implies that under













































































































) , the difference between those two expressions
is smaller than ε so (σn, τn) is an ε-equilibrium.
With the same idea one can construct an ε-equilibrium in
Example 4.3.2 where both players choose state 6 until for a long time
and then switch to state 8 or 9.
4.4 Payoff properties under ε-equilibrium and
existence of the value
Competitive search games are not constant-sum games, and the payoff
functions are not continuous as mentioned in Proposition 4.8.2. Thus,
the notion of value is not clear yet, and its existence is not immediate.
We will first show that if a player chooses an ε-best response against
the strategy of the other player, the payoffs almost add up to 1. Thus,
the game is essentially constant-sum, so the notion of value becomes
natural. Then, we show the existence of the value of these games, to
finally prove existence of ε-optimal strategies for both players for all
ε > 0 and relate optimal strategies and equilibria.
Lemma 4.4.1. Consider a strategy τ for player 2. Let ε > 0. If the strategy
σ of player 1 is an ε-best response against τ , then under (σ, τ) the object is
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found with probability at least 1− ε · |S|. In other words,
u1(σ, τ) + u2(σ, τ) ≥ 1− ε · |S|.
A similar statement holds with exchanged roles of the players.
Proof. Note that the sequence of events ([t < Θ < +∞])t∈N is decreasing
and its limit is the empty set. Thus, (P(σ,τ)(t < Θ < ∞))t is decreas-
ing and converges to 0 as t goes to ∞, by σ-additivity of probability
measures.
Suppose that player 1 plays σ against τ . Then player 1 finds the object
with probability u1(σ, τ) = P(σ,τ)(Θ ∈ Nodd). Assume now that player
1 follows σ until a certain period T ∈ N, and then deviates from σ
by choosing a state uniformly from period T + 2 onward, and denote
this strategy σ′. Then player 1 finds the object at period T + 2 with
probability (1 − P(σ,τ)(Θ ≤ T + 1))/|S|. Thus, u1(σ′, τ) ≥ P(σ,τ)(Θ ∈
Nodd, Θ ≤ T ) + (1−P(σ,τ)(Θ ≤ T + 1))/|S|. As σ is an ε-best response
against τ , it holds that
P(σ,τ)(Θ ∈ Nodd) = u1(σ, τ) ≥ u1(σ′, τ)− ε = P(σ′,τ)(Θ ∈ Nodd)− ε.
So, since σ and σ′ are identical for Θ ≤ T + 1 this implies
P(σ,τ)(Θ ∈ Nodd,Θ ≥ T + 2)
≥ P(σ′,τ)(Θ ∈ Nodd,Θ ≥ T + 2)− ε
≥ (1− P(σ,τ)(Θ ≤ T + 1))/|S|−ε
= P(σ,τ)(Θ ≥ T + 2))/|S|−ε
≥ P(σ,τ)(Θ ∈ Nodd,Θ ≥ T + 2))/|S|+P(σ,τ)(Θ =∞)/|S|−ε.
It follows that
P(σ,τ)(Θ =∞)
≤ P(σ,τ)(Θ ∈ Nodd,Θ ≥ T + 2)) · (|S|−1) + ε · |S|
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≤ P(σ,τ)(T + 2 ≤ Θ <∞)) · (|S|−1) + ε · |S|.
As (P(σ,τ)(T + 2 ≤ Θ < ∞))T converges to 0 when T goes to∞, then
P(σ,τ)(Θ = ∞) ≤ ε · |S|. Thus, u1(σ, τ) + u2(σ, τ) = P(σ,τ)(Θ < ∞) =
1− P(σ,τ)(Θ =∞) ≥ 1− ε · |S|.
We denote v1 = supσ∈Σ infτ∈T u1(σ, τ)
and v2 = supτ∈T infσ∈Σ u2(σ, τ).











v1 + v2 = 1. (4.3)
Proof. First we prove equality (4.1). In this equality, player 1 is maxi-
mizing u1(σ, τ) and player 2 is minimizing the same expression. Note
that (σ, τ) 7→ u1(σ, τ) is bounded. Moreover, by Proposition 4.8.2, it is
lower semi-continuous, and hence Borel measurable. Now, equality
(4.1) follows from [69], [70] or Maitra and Sudderth (1998).
Equality (4.2) follows similarly.
We now show that v1 + v2 ≤ 1. Let ε > 0 and let (σ, τ) be an ε-
equilibrium. We have:
u1(σ, τ) ≥ sup
σ′
u1(σ





′, τ)− ε = v1 − ε.
Similarly, u2(σ, τ) ≥ v2 − ε. Then,
v1 + v2 ≤ u1(σ, τ) + u2(σ, τ) + 2 · ε ≤ 1 + ε.
As ε > 0 is arbitrary, we get v1 + v2 ≤ 1.
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We now show that v1 + v2 ≥ 1. Let ε > 0 and let (σ′, τ) be a strategy
profile where σ′ is an ε best response against τ . Then by Lemma 4.4.1
we have u1(σ, τ) ≥ 1−u2(σ, τ)− ε · |S|. Denote Bτε ⊆ Σ the set of ε-best

























u2(σ, τ)− ε · |S|
= 1− v2 − ε · |S|.
As ε > 0 is arbitrary, we conclude that v1 + v2 ≥ 1.
The last theorem of this section shows that all ε-equilibria give almost
the same payoffs, for small ε.
Theorem 4.4.3. For each ε ≥ 0, for each ε-equilibrium (σ, τ):
1. the object is found with probability at least 1− ε · |S|,
2. |u1(σ, τ)− v1|≤ ε and |u2(σ, τ)− v2|≤ ε, where v1 and v2 are charac-
terised above Proposition 4.4.2.
Proof.
1. It is a direct consequence from Lemma 4.4.1.
2. Let ε ∈ (0, 1). Let (σ, τ) be an ε-equilibrium. As a consequence of
Proposition 4.4.2,
u1(σ, τ) ≥ sup
σ′∈Σ
u1(σ
′, τ)− ε ≥ sup inf
σ′∈Σ τ ′∈T
u1(σ
′, τ ′)− ε = v1 − ε.
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Similarly, u2(σ, τ) ≥ v2 − ε. Thus
u1(σ, τ) ≤ 1− u2(σ, τ) ≤ 1− (v2 − ε) = v1 + ε.
Similarly, u2(σ, τ) ≤ v2 + ε. Those inequalities give [2].
A competitive search game is not a constant sum game in a strict sense.
However, Proposition 4.4.2 and Theorem 4.4.3 show that, in essence,
it has the same properties as a game in which the payoffs add up to 1
and thus the players have opposite interest. This leads to the following
definition.
Definition 4.4.4. Consider a competitive search game, and let v1 and
v2 be as above Proposition 4.4.2.
1. We call v = v1 the value of the game.
2. For ε ≥ 0, we say that σ ∈ Σ is an ε-optimal strategy for player 1
if u1(σ, τ) ≥ v1 − ε for every τ ∈ T . Similarly, we say that τ ∈ T
is an ε-optimal strategy for player 2 if u2(σ, τ) ≥ v2 − ε for every
σ ∈ Σ.
For ε-optimal strategies we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4.5. Consider a competitive search game.
1. For all ε ≥ 0, if (σ, τ) is an ε-equilibrium, then σ and τ are ε-optimal
strategies.
2. For all ε ≥ 0, if σ and τ are ε-optimal strategies, then (σ, τ) is a
2ε-equilibrium.
3. A strategy profile (σ, τ) is a 0-equilibrium if and only if σ and τ are
0-optimal strategies.
4. For all ε > 0, each player has a pure ε-optimal strategy.
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Proof.
1. Let (σ, τ) be an ε-equilibrium. Hence, u1(σ, τ) ≥ u1(σ′, τ)− ε for all
σ′ ∈ Σ. Then, u1(σ, τ) ≥ v1 − ε, which means that σ is an ε-optimal
strategy for player 1. Similarly, τ is an ε-optimal strategy for player 2.
2. Assume now that σ and τ are ε-optimal strategies for player 1 and
player 2. Let σ′ ∈ Σ. Then, u2(σ′, τ) ≥ v2 − ε. By Proposition 4.4.2, we
get that
u1(σ
′, τ) ≤ 1− u2(σ′, τ) ≤ 1− (v2 − ε) = v1 + ε.
This implies that u1(σ, τ) ≥ v1−ε ≥ u1(σ′, τ)−2ε. Similarly, we obtain
u2(σ, τ) ≥ u2(σ, τ ′)−2ε for every τ ′ ∈ T So, (σ, τ) is a 2ε-equilibrium.
3. This is a direct consequence of [1] and [2].
4. This is a consequence of [1] and Theorem 4.3.2.
4.5 Additional results
4.5.1 Subgame optimal strategies
The notion of ε-optimal strategy is a relevant solution concept as it
guarantees the maximal payoff against any strategy. However, this
notion does not take into account eventual mistakes of the opponent.
Hence, in this subsection we examine subgame ε-optimal strategies.
A strategy σ for player 1 is called subgame ε-optimal if, in each subgame,
the continuation strategy of σ is ε-optimal. More precisely, for each
history h ∈ Hodd and strategy τ ∈ T for player 2
u1(σ, τ)(h) ≥ v1(h)− ε.
The definition of a subgame ε-optimal strategy for payer 2 is similar.
Example 4.5.1. In this example, we show that there are ε-optimal strate-
gies that are not subgame perfect ε-optimal strategies. The set of states
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is S = {1, 2}, the transition matrix P is the identity over S and the
initial probability distribution is p = (1, 0).
1 2
1 1
The value of player 1 is v1 = 1 and any optimal strategy of player 1
starts looking at state 1. Then, v2 = 0 and all the strategies of player 2
are 0-optimal. In particular, it is optimal for player 2 to always choose
state 2. Let τ denote this strategy.
Now suppose that player 1 makes a mistake and chooses state 2 at
period 1. Then, the continuation strategy of τ from period 2 is not
optimal. In fact, it would be the best for player 2 to choose state 1 at
period 2 and win the game.
Proposition 4.5.1. Consider a competitive search game.
1. For every ε > 0, each player has a pure strategy which is subgame
ε-optimal.
2. Let ε ∈ (0, 1|S|). If σ is a subgame ε-optimal strategy for player 1, then
for every strategy τ of player 2, the object is found with probability 1
under the strategy profile (σ, τ). A similar statement holds for player 2.
Proof. [1] Let ε > 0. In [28] and [29] it is shown that there exists a
subgame perfect ε-equilibrium (σ, τ) in pure strategies. Now consider
a subgame at a history h. Since the continuation strategies of σ and
τ at h form an ε-equilibrium, it follows similarly to Proposition 4.4.5
that the continuation strategy of σ at h is ε-optimal in the subgame, and
similarly the continuation strategy of τ at h is ε-optimal in the subgame.
Hence, σ and τ are subgame ε-optimal.
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[2] Let ε ∈ (0, 1|S|) and let σ be a subgame ε-optimal strategy. Consider
a history h at an odd period. The strategy for player 1 which looks at a
state with the highest probability guarantees 1/|S| in the subgame at h.
So, v(h) ≥ 1/|S|.
Now consider a strategy τ for player 2. Then, we have u1(σ, τ)(h) ≥
1/|S|−ε > 0. In particular, in the subgame at h, the object is found with
probability at least 1/|S|−ε > 0 under (σ, τ). Since this holds for every
history h at an odd period, by Lévy’s zero-one law, the object is found
with probability 1 under (σ, τ).
4.5.2 Structure of the optimal actions
In this subsection, we present some structural properties of the opti-
mal actions. For all s ∈ S and for all p ∈ ∆(S), we denote v1(p) the
value of the game with initial probability distribution p, and v1(p, s)
the expected payoff of player 1 if he chooses state s at period 1 when
the initial distribution is p, assuming that both players will play op-
timally afterwards. In other words, v1(es) = v1(es, s) = 1 and for all
p ∈ ∆(S)\{es},
v1(p, s) := p(s) + (1−p(s)) · (1− v1(p¬sP )) = 1− (1−p(s)) · v1(p¬sP ),
where p¬s is the probability distribution p conditional to the fact that the
object is not in state s. In other words, p¬s(s) = 0 and p¬s(j) = p(j)1−p(s)
for all j 6= s. Note that v1(p) = maxs∈S v1(p, s). We also denote for
all s ∈ S the set As of the probability distributions for which it is
optimal for player 1 to look at state s at period 1. In other words,
As = {p ∈ ∆(S) | v1(p, s) = v1(p)}. Note that ∪s∈SAs = ∆(S).
Theorem 4.5.2. The optimality regions As have the following properties.
[1] If the initial probability p is sufficiently close to es, for some state s, then
choosing state s is the only optimal action. That is, the region As\∪j 6=sAj is a
neighborhood of es in ∆(S).
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[2] Looking at a state in which the object is with zero probability is never better
than looking anywhere else. That is, for all states s, s′ ∈ S, for all p ∈ ∆(S),
if p(s′) = 0 then v1(p, s′) ≤ v1(p, s).
[3] For each subset N ⊆ S, the convex hull of the vertices es with s ∈ N is
included in the set ∪s∈NAs.
[4] There is an initial distribution at which choosing any state is optimal. That
is, ∩s∈SAs 6= ∅.
[5] For all s ∈ S, the region As is star convex centered in es. That is, if p ∈ As
then the whole line segment between p and es is included in As.
Proof.
[1] The statement follows from the facts that each v(p, s) is continuous
(cf. Theorem 4.8.4) in p and that v(es, s) = 1 and v(es, j) < 1 for all
j 6= s.
[2] Assume p(s′) = 0 for some state s′ ∈ S. Let s ∈ S. Let (σ, τ) be a
strategy profile such that σ1(∅) = s and σ and τ be Markov strategies :
for each t ∈ Nodd (resp. t ∈ Neven), σt (resp. τt) is constant over the
set Ht. Let σ′ ∈ Σ be a Markov strategy of player 1 that starts looking
at state s′. Let p ∈ ∆(S) and remark that p = p(s) · es + (1− p(s)) · p¬s
for all s ∈ S, where es ∈ ∆(S) is the vector with es(s) = 1 and es(j) = 0
for all j 6= s. We have :
u1(σ
′, τ)(p) = p(s) · u1(σ′, τ)(es) + (1− p(s)) · u1(σ′, τ)(p¬s)
≤ p(s) · 1 + (1− p(s)) · u1(σ′, τ)(p¬s)
= p(s) · 1 + (1− p(s)) · u1(σ, τ)(p¬s)
= p(s) · u1(σ, τ)(es) + (1− p(s)) · u1(σ, τ)(p¬s)
= u1(σ, τ)(p).
where the first equality comes from the linearity of the payoff function
in respect of p (see Section 4.8.3), the first inequality comes from the
fact that the payoffs are bounded from above by 1, the second equality
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comes from the fact [p¬s](s) = [p¬s](s′) = 0 and that the game played
will be the same as σ, σ′ and τ are not behavioral, the third equality
comes from u1(σ, τ)(es) = 1 as σ1(∅) = s, and the fourth equality comes
from the linearity of the payoff in respect of p. Taking the supremum
over σ and the infimum over τ on both sides, we get v1(p, s′) ≤ v1(p, s).
[3] Let p ∈ conv({es|s ∈ N}). Then p(s) = 0 for all s /∈ N . By [2], there
is an optimal action j ∈ N , and hence p ∈ ∪s∈NAs.
[4] We will use the Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz (KKM) theo-
rem4, see [61]. Note that by Theorem 4.8.4, the function p 7→ v(p, s) is
continuous for all s ∈ S. Thus, each region As is closed. From this fact
and from [3], we can apply the KKM theorem. We conclude from the
KKM Theorem that ∩s∈SAs 6= ∅.
[5] Let s ∈ S, let p ∈ As and let λ ∈ [0, 1]. We want to show that




s + (1− λ)p)
= sup
σ





















where we used that u1(σ, τ)(es) = 1 for any strategy σ that looks at
state s at period 1. Hence





s + (1− λ)p)
4The KKM theorem states: Let n ∈ N be the cardinal of the set of states S, in other
words |S|= n. Let ∆n be the simplex in Rn. A KKM covering is defined as a
collection C1, . . . , Cn of closed sets such that for any N ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, the convex
hull of the vertices corresponding to N is covered by ∪s∈NCs. Then any KKM
covering has a non-empty intersection, i.e.: ∩s∈SCs 6= ∅.
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Figure 4.3: P = I3 Figure 4.4: P = Q
Figure 4.5: Regions A1, A2 and A3 when P = I3








= λ+ (1− λ) · v(σ, τ).
On the other hand, by theorem 4.8.3, v1(λes + (1 − λ)p, s) = λ + (1 −
λ) · v1(p, s). So, choosing s when the initial probability distribution is
λes + (1− λ)p is optimal.











. The sets A1, A2 and A3 are represented in the time-
homogeneous case where the transition matrix is the identity matrix in
Figure 4.3 and in Figure 4.5, and the matrix Q in Figure 4.4.
Example 4.5.2 illustrates the statements of Theorem 4.5.2. It particular
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here are some remarks.
• It makes intuitive sense that if the object is in a certain state with
probability close to 1, then it is optimal to look at this state. Geo-
metrically, this means that for all states s ∈ S, the set As contains
a neighborhood of es in ∆(S).
• Looking at a state s′ such that p(s′) = 0 can still be (weakly)
optimal. For example, in Figure 4.3 with initial probability dis-
tribution p = (1/2, 1/2, 0), looking at state 3 is just as good as
looking at either state 1 or state 2.
• Figure 4.5 illustrates that the intersection of the regions Ai can be
more than a single point.
• Figure 4.5 illustrates the sets As are not always convex. However
we conjecture that their relative interior is convex, in which case
the closure of the relative interior of the sets As are polytopes.
4.5.3 Time-homogeneous Markov chains
In this subsection, we consider time-homogeneous competitive search
games. A game is time-homogeneous when the transition matrix Pt
at each period is the same. In this case, we will denote the transition
matrix at each period by P . For all r ∈ N we denote P r, the matrix P
applied r times.
Recall that a transition matrix P is irreducible if for each entry (i, j),
there exists r ∈ N such that the entry (i, j) of P r is positive. A transition
matrix P is periodic of period r ≥ 2 if for all k ∈ N, P k(x, x) > 0 only if
k = r · l for some l ∈ N. If P is not periodic, we say that P is aperiodic.
A subset S′ ⊆ S is ergodic if for (i, j) ∈ S′ × (S\S′), P (i, j) = 0 and
the transition matrix P restricted to the set S′ is irreducible. A state
i ∈ S is called absorbing if P (i, i) = 1. A state i ∈ S is transient if
limr→∞ P r(i, i) = 0.
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A probability distribution π ∈ ∆(S) over the set S is called a stationary
distribution for the transition matrix P if πP = π.
It is known that (see [63], Corollary 1.17 and Theorem 4.9) if the tran-
sition matrix P is irreducible, then there exists a unique stationary
distribution π ∈ ∆(S). If P is also aperiodic, then there exist constants
β ∈ (0, 1) and c > 0 such that for all t ∈ N,
||pP t − π||TV≤ c · βt,
where ||p−q||TV = max
A⊂S
∑
s∈A(p(s)−q(s)) is the total variation distance
over ∆(S).
First we show that if the initial probability distribution is exactly an
invariant distribution of the transition matrix P , then player 1 has a
weak advantage.
Proposition 4.5.3. Consider a time-homogenenous competitive search game.
If π is an invariant distribution of P , then v(π) ≥ 1/2.
Proof. Assume first that there is a state s ∈ S for which π(s) = 0. Then
π¬sP = πP = π. Since π(s) = 0 we have v(π, s) = 1 − v(π). As
v(π) ≥ v(π, s), we obtain v(π) ≥ 1− v(π). Hence, v(π) ≥ 1/2.
Assume there is no state s ∈ S for which p(s) = 0. Consider the game
G′ that arises by adding a state w to G. More precisely, G′ is the game
with set of states S′ = S ∪ {w}, initial probability distribution p′ which
places the same probabilities on states in S and probability zero on state
w, and transition matrix P ′ that has the same transition probabilities
between states in S and makes w absorbing. Then, the object will
never be in w with probability 1. From Step 1 of the proof of [2] in
Theorem 4.5.2, the players may ignore state w during the game. Let
π′ be the distribution on S′ that coincides with π on S and π′(w) = 0.
Then, π′ is an invariant distribution of P ′, and hence by the first part
we find v(π) = v′(π′) ≥ 1/2.
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Remarks. We conjecture that if P is irreducible and aperiodic, then
v1(π) > 1/2.
The value v1(p) can be smaller than 1/2 if p is not the invariant dis-
tribution. Indeed, for example with three states, initial probability
distribution p = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) and a transition matrix P such that at
the second period the object is in state 1 with probability 1.
Theorem 4.5.4. Consider a time-homogeneous competitive search game. As-
sume that the transition matrix P is irreducible and aperiodic. Then, no matter
the initial probability distribution p, every strategy profile finds the object with
probability 1. Hence, the payoff functions are continuous in this game, and
there exists a 0-equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof. As mentioned, the transition matrix P has a unique stationary
distribution π ∈ ∆(S) and π(s) > 0 for all s ∈ S. Moreover, there exist
constants c > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1) such that |pP t(s) − π(s)|≤ c · βt for all
t ∈ N, for all s ∈ S and for all p ∈ ∆(S). Hence, there exists t∗ ∈ N with
the following property: for all p ∈ ∆(S), for all s ∈ S, for all t ≥ t∗, we
have (pP t)(s) > δ2 , where δ = mins∈S π(s). Without loss of generality
we can assume that t∗ ≥ 2.
Let α = δ4(t∗−1) . The proof is divided into four steps.
STEP 1: Let (σ, τ) be a pure strategy profile, and let (st)t∈N denote the
induced sequence of actions. We show that the object is found during
the first t∗ periods with probability at least α.
PROOF: For each t ∈ N, let pt = (pt(s))s∈S ∈ ∆(S) denote the probabil-
ity distribution of the location of the object at period t, conditional on
not being found through the history (s1, . . . , st−1).
If there is a period t ≤ t∗ such that pt(st) ≥ α, then under (σ, τ), the
object is found at period t with probability at least α, if it has not been
found before. Hence, the claim of step 1 is true.
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Therefore, it suffices to show that if at each period t ≤ t∗ − 1 we have
pt(st) < α, then pt∗(st∗) ≥ α. So assume that at each period t ≤ t∗ − 1
we have pt(st) < α. The idea of the calculation below is that, since the
object is found with low probabilities at the first t∗ − 1 periods, the
probability distribution for the object at period t∗ on condition that it
is not found during the first t∗ − 1 periods is almost the same as the
unconditioned probability distribution. That is, pt∗ is close to pP t
∗−1,
which is in turn close to the invariant distribution.
Note that, if the players do not condition on the past, the probability
distribution of the location of the object at period t∗ is simply pP t
∗−1.
We have
||pt∗ − pP t
∗−1||TV ≤ ||pt∗ − pt∗−1P ||TV +||pt∗−1P − pP t
∗−1||TV
= ||p¬st∗−1t∗−1 P − pt∗−1P ||TV +||pt∗−1P − pP t
∗−1||TV
≤ ||p¬st∗−1t∗−1 − pt∗−1||TV +||pt∗−1 − pP t
∗−2||TV
= pt∗−1(st∗−1) + ||pt∗−1 − pP t
∗−2||TV
< α+ ||pt∗−1 − pP t
∗−2||TV
< α · (t∗ − 1) + ||p1 − pP 0||TV





Here, in the first inequality we used the triangle inequality. In the
first equality, we used that pt∗ = p
¬st∗−1
t∗−1 P , as p
¬st∗−1
t∗−1 is the probability
distribution of the location of the object at period t∗ − 1 conditional on
the fact that the object has not been found before period t∗ − 1 and that
it is not in state st∗−1 at period t∗ − 1 after the history (s1, . . . , st∗−2)
and not being in state st∗−1 at period t∗ − 1. The second inequality is
true as ||qP − q′P ||TV≤ ||q − q′||TV for all q, q′ ∈ ∆(S). The second
equality follows from the above interpretation of p¬st∗−1t∗−1 and of the total
variation norm. The third inequality is due to the assumption that at
each period t ≤ t∗ − 1 we have pt(st) < α. The fourth inequality then




pt∗(st∗) ≥ (pP t










This completes the proof of Step 1.
STEP 2: Consider any strategy profile (σ, τ). We show that the object is
found during the first t∗ periods with probability at least α.
PROOF: On the finite horizon t∗, each strategy can be equivalently
represented as a mixed strategy, i.e. a probability distribution on the
finite set of pure strategies on horizon t∗ (see for example [72]). Hence,
Step 2 follows from Step 1.
STEP 3: Consider any strategy profile (σ, τ). We show that the object
is found with probability 1 under (σ, τ). By Proposition 4.8.2, this will
imply that the payoff functions are continuous in this game.
PROOF: By Step 2, the object is found during the first t∗ periods with
probability at least α. Since t∗ and therefore α do not depend on the
initial distribution of the object, if the object is not found in the first
t∗ periods, then it will be found between periods t∗ + 1 and 2t∗ with
probability at least α. By repeating this argument, the object is found
with probability 1 under (σ, τ).
STEP 4: We show that there exists a 0-equilibrium in pure strategies.5
PROOF: In view of Theorem 4.3.2, for each n ∈ N, there exists a 1n -
equilibrium (σn, τn) in pure strategies. Since Σ and T are compact and
metrizable, by taking a subsequence if necessary, we can assume that
the sequence (σn, τn)n∈N converges to a strategy profile (σ, τ) in pure
strategies as n→∞ .
5By Step 3, the payoffs in the game are continuous. Since perfect info, it follows from
[33] en [49] that there even exists a subgamne perfect 0-eq in pure strategies.
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For each n ∈ N, we have u1(σn, τn) ≥ u1(σ′, τn)− 1n and u2(σn, τn) ≥
u2(σ
n, τ ′) − 1n for all σ′ ∈ Σ and τ ′ ∈ T . Since by Step 3 the payoff
functions u1 and u2 are continuous, by taking the limits as n→∞, we
obtain u1(σ, τ) ≥ u1(σ′, τ) and u2(σ, τ) ≥ u2(σ, τ ′) for all σ′ ∈ Σ and
τ ′ ∈ T . Hence, (σ, τ) is a 0-equilibrium in pure strategies.
Remark 3. Consider a time-homogeneous search game. If this game
does not satisfy the condition of Theorem 4.5.4, i.e. the transition matrix
is not irreducible or not aperiodic, then the conclusion of Theorem 4.5.4
is no longer true, and there is even an initial probability distribution of
the object and a strategy profile under which the object is found with
probability zero. Indeed, if the transition matrix is not irreducible or
not aperiodic, we distinguish the following three (not exclusive) situa-
tions: (i) If there is a transient state, then consider an initial probability
distribution which places probability zero on every transient state and
a strategy profile which always chooses a transient state. (ii) If there
is more than 1 ergodic class, then consider an initial probability distri-
bution which places probability 1 on an ergodic class and a strategy
profile which always chooses a state in another ergodic class. (iii) If
there is a periodic ergodic class, then consider an initial probability dis-
tribution which places probability 1 on a state. Then due to periodicity,
at each period there is a state where the object is with probability zero
(see Exercise 1.6 of [63]). So consider a strategy profile which always
chooses such a state.
4.6 Variations
In this section we study two related versions of the search game: first
where the horizon of the game is finite, and second through discounting
when the players want to find the object as soon as possible. As we
will see, the ε-optimal strategies of the original model are robust, in the
sense that they are 2ε-optimal if the horizon of the game is finite but
sufficiently long, and they are also 2ε-optimal in the discounted version
of the game, provided that the discount factor is close to 1. Similarly,
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each strategy that is optimal on a finite but sufficiently long horizon or
for a high discount factor is also ε-optimal in the original search game.
In particular, as the optimal strategies over the finite horizon games
can be calculated easily, we obtain ε-optimal strategies in the original
search game that are easy to calculate and to implement.
4.6.1 The finite horizon version of the search game
Suppose that the game ends at a specific period T ∈ N, if it has not
ended before. For simplicity, we will focus on player 1. Let
u1,T (σ, τ) = P(σ,τ)(Θ ∈ Nodd, Θ ≤ T )
denote the probability that player 1 finds the object within the T first pe-
riods under (σ, τ). We assume that player 1 is maximizing u1,T whereas










Note that, with exchanged roles of the players, we could also define
v2,T . However, since the game has finite horizon, it may have a positive
probability under each strategy profile that the object is not found,
so it will not always be true that v1,T + v2,T = 1; in contrasts with
Proposition 4.4.2 for the infinite horizon.
An advantage of the finite point of view is that unlike the infinite
horizon, the value in finite horizon can be computed explicitly via the
following dynamic programming equations:
v1,1(p) = v1,2(p) = ||p||∞,




p(s1) + (1− p(s1)(1− [p¬s1P1](s2)) · v1,T−2([p¬s1P1]¬s2P2).
As we mentioned in the beginning of this section, the finite horizon
search game is strongly related to the original search game.
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Definition 4.6.1. Let α ∈ (0, 1). A transition matrix P is α-strongly
mixed if for all (i, j) ∈ S2, P (i, j) ≥ α.
Theorem 4.6.2. Consider a competitive search game.
[1] Let ε > 0. Let σ∗ ∈ Σ be an ε-optimal strategy for player 1 in the original
search game, and for all T ∈ N, let σ∗T be a strategy for player 1 such that
u1,T (σ
∗
T , τ) ≥ v1,T for each strategy τ of player 2. Then, there exists T̃ ∈ N
such that for all T ≥ T̃ , for all strategy τ ∈ T ,
u1,T (σ
∗, τ) ≥ v1 − 2ε ≥ v1,T − 2ε. (4.4)
Consequently, v1,T converges to v1 as T goes to∞ and for all T ≥ T̃ ,
u1,T (σ
∗
T , τ) ≥ v1 − ε ≥ v1,T − ε. (4.5)
[2] If there exists a real number α ∈ (0, 1) such that for all T ∈ N the
transition matrix PT at period T is α-strongly mixed, then for all T ∈ N
v1 ≥ v1,T ≥ v1 − (1− α)T−1.
[3] Analogous statements hold for player 2.
Proof.
PROOF OF [1]. The second inequality in (4.4) and the second inequality
in (4.5) are trivial. We now prove that for large T the first inequality
of (4.4) holds. Assume by way of contradiction that for every T̃ ∈ N,
there exists T ≥ T̃ and there is a strategy τT such that u1,T (σ∗, τT ) <
v1 − 2ε. Since the set of strategies T for player 2 is compact, by taking
a subsequence if necessary, we can assume that τT converges to some
strategy τ as T →∞. Note that for every T ′ ≤ T we have
u1,T ′(σ
∗, τT ) ≤ u1,T (σ, τT ) < v1 − 2ε.
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By taking the limit for T → ∞, we find u1,T ′(σ∗, τ) ≤ v1 − 2ε. Since
this holds for all T ′, when taking the limit for T ′ → ∞, we obtain
u1(σ
∗, τ) ≤ v1 − 2ε < v1 − ε. This is a contradiction with the choice of






u1,T (σ, τ) ≥ min
τ
u1,T (σ
∗, τ) ≥ v1 − ε/2
for T large enough, where the last inequality comes from (4.4).
From this it follows that for all ε > 0, there exists a T̃ ∈ N such that for
all T ≥ T̃ , u1,T (σ∗T , τ) ≥ v1,T ≥ v1 − ε. Hence, for large T the inequality
(4.5) holds as well.
PROOF OF [2]. The first inequality is trivial. Assume that there exists
a real number α ∈ (0, 1) such that for all T ∈ N the transition matrix
PT at period T is α-strongly mixed. Let T ∈ N. We use the following
notations:
• σ∗T is an optimal strategy for player 1 in the zero-sum game with
payoffs (u1,T ,−u1,T ),
• σ−T an optimal strategy for player 1 in the zero-sum game with
payoffs (−u2,T , u2,T ),
• τ∗T an optimal strategy for player 2 in the zero-sum game with
payoffs (−u2,T , u2,T ),
• τ−T an optimal strategy for player 2 in the zero-sum game with
payoffs (u1,T ,−u1,T ).
Let (σ, τ) be a strategy profile. We have:
u1,T (σ, τ) + u2,T (σ, τ)
=u1,T−1(σ, τ) + u2,T−1(σ, τ) + P(σ,τ)(Θ = T )
≥u1,T−1(σ, τ) + u2,T−1(σ, τ) + [1− u1,T−1(σ, τ)− u2,T−1(σ, τ)] · α
= (1− α) · [u1,T−1(σ, τ) + u2,T−1(σ, τ)] + α.
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Then,
u1,T (σ, τ) + u2,T (σ, τ)− 1 ≥ (1− α) · [u1,T−1(σ, τ) + u2,T−1(σ, τ)− 1] ,
which implies by induction
u1,T (σ, τ) + u2,T (σ, τ)− 1 ≥ (1− α)T−1 · [u1,1(σ, τ) + u2,1(σ, τ)− 1]
= (1− α)T−1 · [p(σ(∅))− 1].
Thus,
u1,T (σ, τ) + u2,T (σ, τ)











≥ u1,T (σ−T , τ−T ) + u2,T (σ−T , τ−T )
≥ 1− (1− α)T−1
= v1 + v2 − (1− α)T−1
As u2,T (σ−T , τ
∗
T ) = v2,T ≤ v2, it implies
v1,T ≥ u1,T (σ∗T , τ−T ) ≥ v1 − (1− α)T−1.
4.6.2 The discounted version of the search game
Now we examine the discounted optimal strategies, once again with





βt−1Pσ,τ (Θ = t),
122
which is the expected discounted time that player 1 finds the object, not
counting the instances where the object is not found. We assume that
player 1 is maximizing u1,β whereas player 2 is minimizing u1,β . This is
a zero-sum game. The reason why we study this game which creates
asymmetry between the players is because in the Theorem 4.6.3 we will
use this lower bound on the payoff player 1 guarantees to show that
player 1 when he plays an optimal best response in the β-discounted
game, the payoff he guarantees converges to the value in the original
game when β goes to 1. Let v1,β denote the value of the β-discounted
game, and let σβ denote a pure optimal 6 strategy of player 1. Note
that the value and such a strategy σβ exist, because the discounted
payoff is continuous (cf. for example Fudenberg and Levine (1983)).
With exchanged roles of the players, we can also define v2,β , and due to
discounting we do not have v1,β + v2,β = 1 for all β ∈ (0, 1) except in
the case when there is a state s ∈ S such that p = es.
As we mentioned in the beginning of this section, the discounted search
game is strongly related to the original search game.
Theorem 4.6.3. Consider a competitive search game.
[1] Let ε > 0. Let σ ∈ Σ be an ε-optimal strategy for player 1, and for all
β ∈ (0, 1), let σ∗β be a strategy for player 1 such that u1,β(σ∗β, τ) ≥ v1,β for
each strategy τ of player 2. Then, there exists β̃ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all
β ∈ (β̃, 1), for all strategies τ ∈ T ,
u1,β(σ, τ) ≥ v1 − 2ε.
Consequently, v1,β → v1 as β → 1 and for all β ∈ (β̃, 1),
u1(σ
∗
β, τ) ≥ v1 − ε.
6In discounted games, one usually considers stationary strategies. In our model, the
natural state space would be the set ∆(S) of possible probability distributions for
the location of the object (often called the belief space, as the players only have a
belief where the object could be). Since this space is infinite, and states are often
only visited once, we omit the detailed discussion of stationarity.
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[2] Analogous statements hold for player 2.
Proof.
PROOF OF [1]. For every T ∈ N let δ(T ) ∈ (0, 1) such that (δ(T ))T−1 ≥
1− 1
T 2













· P(σ,τ)(Θ = t)
≥ u1,T (σ, τ)− 1T .
Hence, for all ε > 0, for all T > 1ε , the statements of the theorem follow
from Theorem 4.6.2. The proof of [2] is similar.
4.7 Concluding remarks and future work
We introduced an infinite horizon search game, in which two players
compete to find an object that moves according to a time-varying
Markov chain. We prove that these games always admit an
ε-equilibrium in pure strategies, for all error-terms ε > 0, but not
necessarily a 0-equilibrium. We showed that the ε-equilibrium payoffs
converge to a singleton (v, 1 − v) as ε vanishes, and therefore the
game is essentially a zero-sum game with value v. We examined
the functional and structural properties of the solutions, and
demonstrated that they are robust to having a finite but long horizon
and respectively to having a sufficiently large discount factor. We
devoted attention to the important special case when the Markov chain
is time-homogeneous, where stronger results hold.
It would be interesting to generalize the results when the active player
is chosen according to an arbitrary stochastic process. Also, one could
introduce overlooking probabilities to the model. In that case, even if
the active player chooses the state that currently contains the object,
there is a positive probability that the player fails to find it.
124
4.8 Appendix
4.8.1 Topological properties of search games
We endow the strategy spaces Σ =
∏
h∈Hodd ∆(S) and
T = ∏h∈Heven ∆(S) with the topology of pointwise convergence. This
is identical with the product topology on Σ and the product topology
on T . Under this topology, the spaces Σ and T are compact, and as
Hodd and Heven are countable, Σ and T are also metrizable.
Definition 4.8.1. Let X be a topological space. A function f : X → R
is called lower semi-continuous at x ∈ X if, for every sequence xn → x,
we have lim infn→∞ f(xn) ≥ f(x). A function f : X → R is called
upper semi-continuous at x ∈ X if, for every sequence xn → x, we have
lim supn→∞ f(x
n) ≤ f(x). A function f : X → R is called continuous at
x ∈ X if it is lower semi-continuous at x and upper semi-continuous at
x.
A function f : X → R is called lower semi-continuous (resp. upper semi-
continuous, resp. continuous) if f is lower semi-continuous at all x ∈ X
(resp. upper semi-continuous at all x ∈ X , resp. continuous at all
x ∈ X).
Proposition 4.8.2. Take a player i ∈ {1, 2}.
1. The payoff function ui : Σ× T → R is lower semi-continuous.
2. Assume that (σ, τ) is a strategy profile under which the object is found
with probability 1. Then, ui is continuous at (σ, τ).
Proof.
1. For each strategy profile (σ, τ) ∈ Σ × T , for each period n ∈ N, we
denote by uni (σ, τ) the probability that player i finds the object during
the first n periods under the strategy profile (σ, τ). Note that uni (σ, τ) is
non-decreasing in n and converges to ui(σ, τ) as n→∞.
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Let (σk, τk)k∈N be a sequence in Σ× T converging to a strategy profile
(σ, τ). We have for each n ∈ N
uni (σ, τ) = lim
k→∞
uni (σ
k, τk) = lim inf
k→∞
uni (σ




Since uni (σ, τ) converges to ui(σ, τ) as n→∞, we obtain




which proves that ui is lower semi-continuous.
2. Assume that under the strategy profile (σ, τ) the object is found with
probability 1. Thus, u1(σ, τ) + u2(σ, τ) = 1. Due to part 1, we only need
to show that u1 and u2 are upper semi-continuous at (σ, τ). We will
prove it for u1; the proof for u2 is similar.




k, τk) = 1− lim inf
k→∞




≤ 1− u2(σ, τ) = u1(σ, τ),
where the first equality is a classic supinf equality applied to a limit,
the first inequality comes from u1 + u2 ≤ 1, the second inequality
follows from part 1, and the second equality comes from the assumption
we made on (σ, τ). Hence, u1 is upper semi-continuous at (σ, τ), as
desired.
4.8.2 Functional properties of the value function
In this section we discuss some general functional properties of the
value function p 7→ v(p). The first theorem is devoted to linear proper-
ties and the second theorem to Lipschitz-continuity. We remind that
the function p 7→ v1(p, s) was introduced at the beginning of the subsec-
tion 4.5.2.
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Theorem 4.8.3. Let (σ, τ) be a strategy profile. Then the expected payoff
functions are linear in the initial probability distribution of the object: for every
λ ∈ [0, 1], for every p, q ∈ ∆(S), for every player i = 1, 2,
ui(σ, τ)(λp+ (1− λ)q) = λ · ui(σ, τ)(p) + (1− λ) · ui(σ, τ)(q). (4.6)
Moreover, for every s ∈ S, the map p 7→ v(p, s) is linear over every line
passing through es (the initial probability distribution having probability 1 on
state s): for every p ∈ ∆(S), for every λ ∈ (0, 1)
v(λes + (1− λ)p, s) = λ+ (1− λ) · v(p, s).
Proof. First we prove equality (4.6). The probability distribution λ · p+
(1 − λ) · q can be interpreted as follows: with probability λ the initial
probability distribution is p and induces the expected payoff ui(σ, τ)(p)
for player i, and with probability (1 − λ) the probability distribution
is q and induces the expected payoff ui(σ, τ, q) for player i. Hence, the
equality (4.6) holds.
Now we prove the second part of the theorem. Let p ∈ ∆(S), p 6= es,
and let λ ∈ (0, 1), and denote p¬s the linear projection of x from es to
the face {y ∈ ∆(S)|ys = 0}. Then
(λes + (1− λ)p)¬s = p¬s.
Indeed, (λes + (1− λ)p)¬s(s) = 0 = [p¬s](s) and for all j 6= s:
(λes + (1− λ)p)¬s(j) = (λe
s + (1− λ)p)(j)
1− (λes + (1− λ)p)(s)
=
(1− λ) · p(j)
1− (λ+ (1− λ) · p(s))
=
(1− λ) · p(j)





1− p(s) = [p
¬s](j).
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Hence, by using (λes + (1− λ)p)(s) = λ+ (1− λ) · p(s) we have
v(λes + (1− λ)p, s)
=(λes + (1− λ)p)(s) + (1− (λes + (1− λ)p)(s)) · (1− v((λes + (1− λ)p)¬sP ))
=(λes + (1− λ)p)(s) + (1− (λes + (1− λ)p)(s)) · (1− v(p¬sP ))
=λ+ (1− λ)(p(s) + (1− p(s)) · (1− v(p¬sP )))
=λ+ (1− λ) · v(p, s)
which completes the proof.
Remark. For each line passing through es, the linearity of the function
p 7→ v(p, s) relies on the fact that if by choosing state s player 1 does
not find the object, then the conditional distribution of the location of
the object, p¬s, stays on the same line. For lines not passing through
es, this is no longer true, and the function p 7→ v(p, s) is generally
non-linear. For example when P = I4, p = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 0) and p′ =
(1/3, 1/3, 0, 1/3). In that case, v(p, 1) = 2/3 and v(p′, 1) = 2/3, but
v1(p/2 + p
′/2, 1) = 1/2.
Before introducing the next theorem, we recall the definition of the total
variation distance: for p, q ∈ ∆(S), the total variation distance between
p and q is the non-negative number





Theorem 4.8.4. Let p, q ∈ ∆(S). Let T ∈ N and let (σ, τ) be a strategy
profile. Then, the functions p 7→ u1,T (σ, τ)(p), p 7→ u1(σ, τ)(p), p 7→ v1,T (p),
p 7→ v1(p, s) and p 7→ v1(p) are 1-Lipschitz continuous with respect to the
total variation distance.









q(s) · u1(σ, τ)(es).
Then,
u1(σ, τ)(p)− u1(σ, τ)(q) =
∑
s∈S






= ||p− q||TV ,
and similarly
u1(σ, τ)(q)− u1(σ, τ)(p) ≤ ||p− q||TV .
Hence, p 7→ u1(σ, τ)(p) is 1-Lipschitz-continuous.
Taking the infimum over τ and the supremum over σ on both sides
of the inequality u1(σ, τ)(p) ≤ u1(σ, τ)(q) + ||p − q||TV gives v1(p) ≤
||p − q||TV +v1(q), which can be written v1(p) − v1(q) ≤ ||p − q||TV .
Similarly, v1(q) − v1(p) ≤ ||p − q||TV . Hence, p 7→ v1(p) is 1-Lipschitz-
continuous too.
The proof for p 7→ u1,T (σ, τ)(p) and p 7→ v1,T (σ, τ) are similar. The proof
for p 7→ v1(p, s) is also similar, but the supremum in σ has to be taken
over the strategies that look at state s at period 1.
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Summary and General Discussion
This thesis is divided into three Chapters. Chapter 2 deals with learning
in games. Chapter 3 is devoted to optimization. Finally Chapter 4
focuses on game theory.
In Chapter 2 we examine the long-term behavior of regret-minimizing
agents in time-varying games with continuous action spaces. In its most
basic form, (external) regret minimization guarantees that an agent’s
cumulative payoff is no worse in the long run than that of the agent’s
best fixed action in hindsight. Going beyond this worst-case guarantee,
we consider a dynamic regret variant that compares the agent’s accrued
rewards to those of any sequence of play. By properly adapting a restart
procedure pioneered by Besbes et al. [7], we show that players are able
to avoid dynamic regret against any test sequence whose total variation
grows sublinearly with the horizon of play. In particular, specializing to
a wide-class of no-regret strategies based on mirror descent, we derive
explicit rates of dynamic regret minimization, both in expectation and
in high probability. We then leverage these results to show that players
are able to stay close to Nash equilibrium in time-varying monotone
games – and even converge to equilibrium if the sequence of stage
games admits a limit.
While the information structure is relevant in some contexts, as the
reviewers of the article mentioned, this structure is not well-adapted
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when the information has a different form than the gradient of a func-
tion. More precisely, in many applications, agents take decisions based
on information (amount of money, quantity of products, ...). Further
work has to be done in order to adapt this kind of information structure,
and study properties of derivative-free algorithms. Another drawback
is that all the agents have to follow the same algorithm. In real life, such
an algorithm would probably be a mediator. Thus, it would be more
natural to target a correlated equilibrium more than a Nash equilibrium.
Such a study would be of great interest.
In Chapter 3 we use a class of strongly convergent primal-dual schemes
for solving variational inequalities defined by a Lipschitz continu-
ous and pseudo-monotone map in infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces,
which have been studied by Dennis Meier in [22]. This novel numerical
scheme is based on Tseng’s forward-backward-forward scheme, which
is known to display weak convergence, unless very strong global mono-
tonicity assumptions are made on the involved operators. We test the
performance of the algorithm in the computationally challenging task
to find dynamic user equilibria in traffic networks and verify that our
scheme is at least competitive to state-of-the-art solvers, and in some
cases even improves upon them.
In general, the commuting operator of a network is not monotone, but
the theoretical convergence of the algorithm relies on this assumption.
Further work should done, both in order to relax the strong assumption
of monotonicity of the operator, and on finding classes of networks that
have a monotone operator.
In Chapter 4 we introduce a discrete-time search game, in which two
players compete to find an object first. The object moves according
to a time-varying Markov chain on finitely many states. The players
know the Markov chain and the initial probability distribution of the
object, but do not observe the current state of the object. The players
are active in turns. The active player chooses a state, and this choice
is observed by the other player. If the object is in the chosen state, this
player wins and the game ends. Otherwise, the object moves according
to the Markov chain and the game continues at the next period.
We show that this game admits a value, and for any error-term ε > 0,
each player has a pure (subgame-perfect) ε-optimal strategy. Inter-
estingly, a 0-optimal strategy does not always exist. The ε-optimal
strategies are robust in the sense that they are 2ε-optimal on all finite
but sufficiently long horizons, and also 2ε-optimal in the discounted
version of the game provided that the discount factor is close to 1. We
derive results on the analytic and structural properties of the value and
the ε-optimal strategies. Moreover, we examine the performance of the
finite truncation strategies, which are easy to calculate and to imple-
ment. We devote special attention to the important time-homogeneous
case, where additional results hold.
Although many variations of this game are interesting (finitely many
players, unknown probability distributions, players move over a graph,
the object does not want to be found), two very relevant computational
questions arise : how can we compute efficiently optimal strategies for
the two players? Is it possible to achieve linear convergence rate of
optimal strategies in the finite horizon game to the optimal ones in the
infinite horizon game for general sequences of permutation matrices?
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Impact of the thesis
Chapter 2 of this thesis deals with decision making when several agents
interact in an environment with a low amount of information. Such
situations are ubiquitous in economics. One can think of companies on
a market, political parties that have to form a coalition, behavior in a
group of humans, animals, to name a few. The agents, based on the in-
formation they received yesterday, can take better individual decisions
today. Consider two factories on a market. If there is overproduction
the previous month, they know they have to reduce their production
during the coming month. The algorithm we studied gives precise
production figures each month, and guarantees that, if both factories
follow this algorithm, they will reach a stable market.
Chapter 3 of this thesis deals with traffic flows. We discuss an algorithm,
known to have good properties, and we run this algorithm with, as
an instance, a network with commuters. The algorithm takes into
consideration all the information of the users, and in order to reduce
the traffic time, it recommends to each agent which road to take. Such
algorithms are applied for example in route planners, such as Google
Maps, Waze, Coyote, Tom-Tom, to name a few.
Chapter 4 of this thesis deals with a game in which two agents interact
in turns to find an object first, where the object is moving over time.
Such a game can be used to model for example patent races, and help to
find good investment strategies. Consider the following situation. Two
laboratories are competing in order to find a vaccine to Covid 19. To
do so, they have to invest in one of different technologies. The model
takes into account that the virus mutates over time, and a vaccine today
might not be effective next year.
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